Washington Law Review
Volume 96

Number 4

12-1-2021

You Are Not a Commodity: A More Efficient Approach to
Commercial Privacy Rights
Benjamin T. Pardue

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Common Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports
Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Internet Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons,
Law and Society Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Benjamin T. Pardue, You Are Not a Commodity: A More Efficient Approach to Commercial Privacy Rights,
96 Wash. L. Rev. 1567 (2021).

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Pardue (Do Not Delete)

12/14/2021 10:07 PM

YOU ARE NOT A COMMODITY: A MORE EFFICIENT
APPROACH TO COMMERCIAL PRIVACY RIGHTS
Benjamin T. Pardue*
Abstract: United States common law provides four torts for privacy invasion:
(1) disclosure of private facts, (2) intrusion upon seclusion, (3) placement of a person in a false
light, and (4) appropriation of name or likeness. Appropriation of name or likeness occurs
when a defendant commandeers the plaintiff’s recognizability, typically for a commercial
benefit. Most states allow plaintiffs who establish liability to recover defendants’ profits as
damages from the misappropriation under an “unjust enrichment” theory. By contrast, this
Comment argues that such an award provides a windfall to plaintiffs and contributes to
suboptimal social outcomes. These include overcompensating plaintiffs and incentivizing
litigation where tortious conduct may improve the social good. Some scholars have already
argued this point concerning trademark claims. This Comment is the first to apply this logic to
appropriation of likeness claims.
Further, overprotecting a person’s recognizability as though it is a sacred property right
contributes to advertisers’ appetite for commodifying consumer time. As an analogy, consider
Ms. Moneybags, the owner of a shoe factory. Ms. Moneybags has no personal use for the
10,000 shoes generated by her factory every day; rather, she creates shoes to sell. She then uses
sales revenue to purchase more equipment, hire more workers, and grow her business to make
more money. By creating and commodifying shoes, Ms. Moneybags exploits natural resources
and labor to increase her capital.
Through a similar analogy, consider Mr. Moviestar, a public personality who uses his
recognizability to generate attention through media. While business models vary, he sells
consumer attention to advertisers, thereby commodifying attention. Like Ms. Moneybags, Mr.
Moviestar’s use for the attention from the masses is limited. In turn, as consumers pay more
attention to Mr. Moviestar, his recognizability grows; he then uses his recognizability to garner
more consumer attention, which he continues to sell to advertisers. Ultimately, Mr. Moviestar
increases his recognizability—his personal brand’s value—by exploiting consumer time and
attention.
Ample literature on law and economics suggests that overprotection of property rights
leads to suboptimal outcomes. Likewise, if tort law overprotects public personalities’ exclusive
right to publicize their name or likeness, then the incentive to build their personal brand value
may be inefficiently high. But public renown does not come from thin air. A personal brand is
built by commodifying consumers’ time and attention. Accordingly, overprotecting the
exclusive right to publicize one’s name or likeness may feed advertisers’ appetite for consumer
attention.
This Comment argues that tort damages in an appropriation of name or likeness action
should be limited to the fair market value of the use. This would mitigate windfalls to plaintiffs,
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thereby easing the incentive to commodify consumer time and attention. Further, this
Comment argues that, in rare instances where an excessive award might be merited, such
actions are better suited for a different privacy tort.

INTRODUCTION
Suppose Sally owns a cosmetics company and seeks to increase
shampoo sales. Sally adds a photo of Jennifer Aniston to the shampoo
labels but never obtains Aniston’s permission. Although legal doctrines
vary by state, Aniston can likely sue Sally for appropriation of name or
likeness.1 Aniston would likely be able to recover the greater of (a) Sally’s
increased profits from the advertisement or (b) the measurable damage to
Aniston’s reputation that the labels caused.2 If a jury finds that Sally’s
actions were particularly egregious, Sally may also owe Aniston for
punitive damages (money awarded to punish Sally and deter others from
similar conduct).3 An award of the defendant’s increased profits from
impermissibly using the plaintiff’s identity is often justified as “a means
of deterring infringement and recapturing gains attributable to wrongful
conduct.”4
This Comment argues that awarding a plaintiff damages based upon a
defendant’s profits for an appropriation of likeness claim gives the
plaintiff a windfall and contributes to inefficient outcomes. Generally,
economists consider gain to be a “windfall” if it is “not foreseen by [the
recipient] and are not in any degree due to efforts made, intelligence
exercised, risks borne, or capital invested by them.”5 Accordingly,
removing these gains should not harm the subject’s incentive to engage in
productive activity.6
In the example here, unless Sally’s unpermitted picture paints Aniston
in a false light7 or reveals embarrassing details, it may not depreciate the
value of Aniston’s “likeness”—that is, her recognizability. Indeed,
additional exposure typically feeds the attention-recognizability feedback
loop, increasing the plaintiff’s value.8 As explained in more detail below,
1. See infra section I.D. This hypothetical uses Sally, a fictional tortfeasor, and Jennifer Aniston, a
celebrity known for cosmetic endorsements, as an arbitrary example.
2. See infra section I.D.2.
3. See infra sections I.B–D.
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1995).
5. A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 156 (3d ed. 1951); see also Windfall, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An unanticipated benefit, . . . in the form of a profit and not caused by
the recipient.”).
6. Id.
7. That is, a false impression that harms Aniston’s reputation. See infra section I.C.
8. As explained in more detail below, attention toward public figures fosters recognizability of
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attention toward public figures fosters the recognizability of public
figures.9 Recognizability is directly related to brand value.10 Public figures
with higher brand value are then more likely to be selected into positions
in which they will gain more attention, and therefore more
recognizability.11 This related cycle constitutes the attentionrecognizability feedback loop.
Awarding damages measured by the defendant’s profits may
disproportionately and inequitably reward the plaintiff for value-added by
the defendant.12 For example, in the hypothetical above, Sally added value
to the community by manufacturing, distributing, and marketing the
shampoo. Because such windfall gains may be inequitable and create
inefficient outcomes, damage awards should be limited to either (a) the
market publicity value had the defendant negotiated with the plaintiff to
use her likeness—known as “quantum meruit”13—or (b) the actual harm
to the plaintiff’s reputation if the plaintiff can demonstrate such harm.14
This Comment further seeks to establish that recognizability (i.e., a
plaintiff’s “likeness”) should be conceptualized as economic capital.
Under this model, recognizability is used to sell consumer attention to
advertisers.15 Thus, consumer attention is commodified for its exchange
value. Additionally, market research suggests that consumer attention
causes consumer attachment to public figures (e.g., celebrities and social
media influencers).16 Marketers commodify consumer attention, which
leads to self-reinforcing concentrations of brand value in celebrities and,
in recent years, the advent of social media “influencers.”17 Because the
tort system awards overly high damages in appropriation of likeness
claims, recognizability is protected too strongly, leading to suboptimal
social outcomes.18
Part I provides an overview of the four primary privacy rights protected
in United States tort law: (1) disclosure of private facts, (2) intrusion upon
public figures. Recognizability is directly related to brand value. Further, public figures with higher
brand value are more likely to be selected into positions in which they will gain more attention, and
therefore more recognizability. See infra Part II.
9. See infra section II.C–D.1.
10. See infra section II.C–D.2.
11. See infra section II.D.
12. See infra section III.A.
13. Quantum meruit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
14. However, this Comment argues that personal brand value is rarely damaged by
misappropriation. See infra section II.D.
15. See infra section II.B.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra section II.D.
18. See infra section III.A.
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seclusion or private affairs, (3) publicity placing a person in a false light,
and (4) appropriation of name or likeness. Part II discusses the classic
“commodification” model, whereby things are produced for exchange
value rather than for immediate use. Specifically, the commodification
model conceptualizes money (i.e., capital, or “M”) transforming into
commodities (“C”), which are sold for more money (“M’” or “M Prime”).
This creates an M-C-M’ feedback loop, where the second M is larger than
the first. Classical economists debated whether this increase in M should
be conceptualized as exploitation of labor or land.19
Part II further discusses the attention economy as it relates to branding
and how personal “brand” contributes to financial value. It then applies
the commodification model to the attention economy in which public
personalities build their “brand.” In this application, recognizability (“R”)
yields attention (“A”) through selection into favorable opportunities,
which yields more recognizability (“R’” or “R Prime”). This creates an RA-R’ feedback loop, where the second R is larger than the first.
Part III argues that awarding defendants’ profits to plaintiffs as
damages in appropriation of likeness suits provides a windfall to
plaintiffs, which leads to suboptimal and inefficient outcomes. Part III
further explains how this problem is exacerbated by the overprotection of
property rights. It seeks to establish that excessively protecting exclusive
publicity rights likely benefits advertisers who wish to commodify
consumer attention. Under this rationale, limiting damages to quantum
meruit would lead to more efficient outcomes. However, Part III also
identifies an exception to this solution. It argues that specific
appropriation of likeness claims that might lead to inefficient outcomes
under quantum meruit would better fit under the elements and justification
of other privacy rights.
Part IV further discusses potential counterarguments against the
solution proposed in Part III that damages in appropriation of likeness
claims should be limited. For example, one counterargument is that, by
limiting damages to the amount a defendant would have paid the plaintiff
had the defendant negotiated to use the plaintiff’s image, some defendants
might be incentivized to take a “better to beg forgiveness than ask
permission” approach. Because not all plaintiffs are willing to undergo
expensive litigation, it might be profitable to never ask permission and
wait until the plaintiff pursues litigation to negotiate a settlement. Many
jurisdictions already address this problem by awarding punitive damages
when the defendant acted intentionally or with reckless disregard to the
19. See infra section II.A. For example, the value of a pencil come both from extracting the wood,
graphite, aluminum, and rubber from land and from the labor used to assemble the pencil. This grossly
oversimplifies the discussion, but a more detailed discussion is outside the scope of this Comment.
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plaintiff’s rights. Another counterargument is that certain product
endorsements may actively harm a plaintiff’s reputation and forcing a
plaintiff to quantify such reputational harm may be too burdensome. But
this harm is usually more appropriately addressed through other privacy
actions. This is not the first paper to argue that appropriation of likeness
violates a commercial right rather than a privacy right.20 However, this is
the first Comment to conceptualize a plaintiff’s likeness as “capital” and
to argue that overprotection of the exclusive right to publicity contributes
to attention commodification.
I.

UNITED STATES LAW PROVIDES FOUR DISCRETE
PRIVACY TORTS

United States common law generally allows four distinct tort actions
for privacy invasion: (1) disclosure of private facts, (2) intrusion upon
seclusion or private affairs, (3) false light, and (4) appropriation of name
or likeness.21 Privacy suits are generally governed by state law;22 thus, the
ways to establish liability, defenses, and damages vary by state.23 Most
states recognize these causes of action through statute or common law.24
However, the rationales behind these actions are generally uniform across
states, with few exceptions.25 Rather than focusing on one state, this
Comment addresses the rationale generally applicable to most states.
The following sections briefly describe the elements of these tort
claims in most jurisdictions, the rationale behind each privacy tort, and
the usual damage awards. Although this Comment focuses on the
appropriation of name or likeness tort, this Part also gives an overview of
20. See, e.g., W. Mack Webner, The Right of Publicity: A Commercial Property Right—Not a
Privacy Right, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 586, 603 (1994) (“The right of publicity is not the right of
privacy. It should be recognized for what it is—a commercial property right, closely analogous to the
trademark . . . .”).
21. For a robust explanation of common law actions for invasion of privacy, see VINCENT R.
JOHNSON, ADVANCED TORT LAW: A PROBLEM APPROACH 345–438 (2d ed. 2014).
22. See id. at 347.
23. For example, some states allow for minimum statutory recovery. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344(a) (West 2021) (describing the elements and remedies for misappropriation claims in
California); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.810(1)(b)(1) (West 2021) (describing the elements and
remedies for misappropriation claims in Nevada); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.013 (West 2021)
(describing the elements and remedies for misappropriation claims in Texas). Others require proof of
pecuniary loss. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1995).
24. See JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 347. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A–
E (AM. L. INST. 1977). Not all states have codified these actions through statute. Compare Lake v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234–35 (Minn. 1998) (sustaining a suit for privacy invasion
based solely on common law even absent a statute), with Zinda v. La. Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548,
555 (Wis. 1989) (examining Wisconsin’s statutory action for public disclosure of private facts).
25. See JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 345–438.
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the other three privacy torts. This will facilitate later discussion of
situations where appropriation claims would fare better if brought in
conjunction with another privacy action.26
A.

The Tort of Disclosure of Private Facts Directly Protects a Person
from Exposure of Embarrassing Details

A defendant is liable for disclosure of private facts when the defendant
“gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another . . . if
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”27
For such publicity to be actionable, the plaintiff must have a reasonable
expectation of privacy concerning the publicized subject matter.28
Additionally, the “publicity” requirement of a disclosure action differs
from the “publication” required in a defamation claim;29 while the latter
merely requires a statement to be communicated to a third party, the
former requires a matter to be made public “by communicating it to the
public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.”30 For example,
26. Specifically, the true interest hurt in some misappropriation claims might be one’s right to be
left alone or free from embarrassment. Accordingly, damages should be awarded for this actual harm,
and not be awarded under the guise of a commercial interest. See infra sections III.C.1–3.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. L. INST. 1977). While the Restatement titles
the tort as “Publicity Given to Private Life,” numerous cases and texts use the more direct name of
“disclosure of private facts” or use that term interchangeably with “publicity given to private life.”
See, e.g., id. § 652D cmt. h; JOHNSON supra note 21, at 347 (titling its section on the tort as
“Disclosure of Private Facts”; Doe v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 85 Wash. App. 213, 220–
21, 932 P.2d 178, 181 (1997) (“[Plaintiff] asserted [Defendant] invaded his right to privacy by public
disclosure of private facts.”), overruled by Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 136 Wash. 2d 195, 961 P.2d 333
(1998); Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, P.C., 367 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Utah 2016) (using “disclosure of
private facts”); Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App. 1982) (same), abrogated on other
grounds by Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994). This Comment uses “disclosure of
private facts” because it more directly speaks to the action for which a defendant is liable.
28. See, e.g., Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998) (“The tort is proven
only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place,
conversation or data source.”); Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 865 (R.I. 1997) (explaining
whether plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in disclosed facts constitutes, in part, a
question of fact that precludes summary judgment); Hoskins v. Howard, 971 P.2d 1135, 1141 (Idaho
1998) (holding that “[t]o establish a claim for public disclosure of private facts,” the plaintiff must
have some reasonable expectation of privacy in the material disclosed).
29. A defendant is liable for defamation when the defendant makes “a false
statement . . . concerning another” in “an unprivileged publication to a third party.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (emphasis added). Defamation requires “publication.”
Id. This can be as simple as telling an untruth to one other person. See id. § 577 cmt. a (“Any act by
which the defamatory matter is intentionally or negligently communicated to a third person is a
publication.”).
30. Id. § 652D cmt. a.
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a creditor who writes a letter to the employer of a debtor, informing the
employer that the debtor owes money is not liable because the information
was not made public.31 But oral communication “in a public restaurant
with numerous customers” in attendance “satisfies any reasonable
requirement as to publicity.”32 Further, the disclosure must be offensive
to a reasonable person.33 It is not sufficient that the information was
confidential34 or that the specific plaintiff felt humiliated35—the
disclosure must be offensive or objectionable under an objective
standard.36 In other words, the disclosure must be “offensive and
objectionable to the reasonable person.”37
For example, Cowles Publishing Co. v. State Patrol38 justified this tort
as a way to prevent others from airing one’s dirty laundry.39 The court
explained that everyone has phases or facts about themselves that they
intentionally keep hidden from the public eye, such as sexual relations,
family quarrels, unpleasant illnesses, personal letters, and a person’s
history that they prefer to leave behind.40 “When these intimate details of
[a person’s] life are spread before the public gaze in a manner highly
offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person], there is an actionable
invasion of . . . privacy.”41
Accordingly, one who has established liability for disclosure of private
facts may be entitled to recover damages measured in two ways. First, a
plaintiff may be able to recover damages measured by “the harm to [the

31. See id. § 652D cmt. a, illus. 1.
32. Biederman’s of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892, 898 (Mo. 1959).
33. Id. at 896.
34. See id. at 896 (holding that, under Missouri law, this tort does not “depend for its validity upon
a breach of confidence”); see also Bratt v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 359 (1st Cir. 1986)
(despite the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant “improperly apprised” others of private facts
about the plaintiff, upholding a summary judgment dismissal because it was “not of such a personal
nature that an intrusion upon privacy results from its disclosure”).
35. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that this tort
“requires . . . that the private facts publicized be such as would make a reasonable person deeply
offended” (emphasis added)).
36. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998).
37. Id. (quoting Diaz v. Oakland Trib., Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (Ct. App. 1983)).
38. 109 Wash. 2d 712, 748 P.2d 597 (1988).
39. See id. at 721, 748 P.2d at 602. The elements and rationale of privacy torts are similar between
states. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 345–438. Accordingly, an analysis of one state’s
regime will be generally applicable to others.
40. Cowles Pub. Co., 109 Wash. 2d at 721, 748 P.2d at 602 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
41. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
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plaintiff’s] interest in privacy resulting from the invasion.”42
Alternatively, a plaintiff may be able to recover damages based upon “[the
plaintiff’s] mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind
that normally results from such an invasion.”43
B.

The Tort of Intrusion upon Seclusion or Private Affairs Protects
Plaintiffs from Offensive Disturbance

A defendant is liable for “intrusion upon seclusion” or private affairs
when the defendant “intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of [the plaintiff] or [the plaintiff’s] private affairs
or concerns, . . . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”44 To establish liability, a plaintiff must show three elements:
(1) that the defendant intruded, (2) that the intrusion invaded the
plaintiff’s private affairs or concerns, and (3) that the intrusion was highly
offensive to the reasonable person.45 First, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant intruded. For example, a photograph taken at an airport—a
place open to the public—is not tortious because there is no intrusion.46
This first element is key to the rationale behind the intrusion upon
seclusion tort: this action protects the “right to be left alone.”47
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant invaded “the
solitude or seclusion of [the plaintiff’s] private affairs or concerns.”48 As
with disclosure of private facts, cases involving intrusion often upon
seclusion emphasize that the defendant must have intruded into a place
where the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy.49 For
example, one court held that a plaintiff had no expectation of privacy from
her employer in her file storage system because it contained work files

42. Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 136 Wash. 2d 195, 205 n.4, 961 P.2d 333, 338 n.4 (1998) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (AM. L. INST. 1977)); see also Doe v. Methodist Hosp.,
690 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Ind. 1997) (“As damages, he alleged that he suffered ‘embarrassment,
humiliation and mental distress.’”).
43. Reid, 136 Wash. 2d at 205 n.4, 961 P.2d at 338 n.4.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. L. INST. 1977).
45. See id.
46. See Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
47. See Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329, 330 (D.S.C. 1966) (“So the right to be left
alone might be thought of as a complex of several torts . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also L.A. Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 2017) (“This form of invasion of
privacy has been described as ‘the right to be let alone.’” (quoting Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232
Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 (Ct. App. 1986))).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. L. INST. 1977).
49. Id.
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along with her private files.50 Another held that an accident victim had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital room.51 Even though the
“hospital patient does not own [their] hospital room . . . the patient [had]
the exclusive right to occupy that room, at least as to hospital outsiders.”52
In short, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating both a reasonable
expectation of privacy and an intrusion.
Third, such an intrusion must “be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”53 For example, an appellate court in Alderson v. Bonner54 upheld
a judgment against a defendant caught in the driveway outside a home
with a video camera and tapes of two residents “in various states of
undress, engaging in everyday activities such as getting dressed,
exercising and using the bathroom.”55 The court held that even though
“standing on another’s front porch and looking through a window in the
door is not normally offensive[,] . . . [w]hen an uninvited man lurks at the
front door at night, peering in the window at a young female, with video
camera in hand . . . such conduct is objectionable.”56 The Pendleton v.
Fassett57 court allowed an intrusion upon seclusion claim against police
officers and denied a motion for summary judgment because there was a
factual dispute as to whether a search was highly offensive.58 In that case,
the officers forced the plaintiff to “bare her breasts as part of the search.”59
These cases provide examples of acts of intrusion that can satisfy this third
element.
Unlike other privacy torts, which require some demonstration of
publicity or publication,60 this tort primarily protects a plaintiff’s “right to
be left alone.”61 For example, secretly filming one’s neighbor getting
50. See Clark v. Teamsters Loc. Union 651, 349 F. Supp. 3d 605, 622 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (“[Plaintiff]
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Dropbox account, which stored a mixture of
work-related and personal documents and was tied to her work e-mail.”). While specific rules vary
by jurisdiction, these examples are representative of the law of most states.
51. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, 455 (Ct. App. 1996), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
52. Id.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. L. INST. 1977).
54. 132 P.3d 1261 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006).
55. Id. at 1264.
56. Id. at 1267.
57. No. 08–227–C, 2009 WL 2849542 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 1, 2009).
58. Id. at *15.
59. Id.
60. Supra section I.A–B.
61. See Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329, 331 (D.S.C. 1966) (“‘The right to be left
alone’ describes this category of invasion of privacy more accurately than it does any of the others,
and it is the most difficult aspect of the action for the courts to deal with, as there are fewer tangible
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dressed would probably not cause economic or reputational harm if the
filmer has no intention of distributing the film.62 But such an offensive,
intrusive act can be intrinsically harmful enough to justify
compensation.63 In short, this tort does not necessarily protect an
economic or reputational interest, but the right against being watched or
observed without consent.
Concerning damages, some jurisdictions award the plaintiff for both
compensatory and punitive damages if the defendant acted particularly
egregiously.64 Additionally, some courts have awarded merely nominal
damages—a small, token dollar amount to recognize a legal wrong—
where the plaintiff cannot prove actual damage.65
C.

The Tort of Publicity Placing a Person in False Light Protects
Plaintiffs when Defendants’ Conduct Does Not Quite Rise to the
Level of Defamation

A defendant is liable for publicizing information about a plaintiff that
places the plaintiff in a false light if (1) the false impression publicized
“would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,” and (2) the defendant
knew or recklessly disregarded that the impression was false.66 This action
is often used as an alternative when the defamation elements67 are not
quite met, or when plaintiffs are merely “made to appear before the public
in an objectionable false light or false position, or in other words,

factors upon which to base a decision.”); see also L.A. Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795,
801 (9th Cir. 2017) (“This form of invasion of privacy has been described as ‘the right to be let
alone.’” (quoting Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 (Ct. App. 1986)).
62. See Alderson v. Bonner, 132 P.3d 1261, 1267 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that injury
was to plaintiff was “primarily a mental one,” rather than a reputational or economic harm (quoting
Peterson v. Idaho Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 287 (1961)).
63. See id. at 1267.
64. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 879 (8th Cir. 2000)
(explaining lower court’s overturn of punitive damages award as based on defendant’s lack of “extraordinary conduct” or “malice or calloused indifference”); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 899 F.2d
271, 277 (4th Cir. 1990), rev’d en banc, 925 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1991).
65. See, e.g., Sabrina W. v. Willman, 540 N.W.2d 364, 371 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (“[I]n an action
for invasion of privacy pursuant to [NEB. REV. STAT.] § 20–203, the damages that a plaintiff may
recover are (1) general damages for harm to the plaintiff’s interest in privacy which resulted from the
invasion; (2) damages for mental suffering; (3) special damages; and (4) if none of these are proven,
nominal damages.”).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. L. INST. 1977).
67. Defamation elements are: “(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an
unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of
special harm caused by the publication.” Id. § 558.
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otherwise than as [they are].”68 While this action is similar to defamation,
it does not require that the defendant expressed false statements of fact
about the plaintiff.69 Rather, it merely requires that the defendant “placed
[the plaintiff] before the public in a false position.”70 Some states reject
the action altogether due to concerns about its usefulness71 or procedural
safeguards.72 Other states reject the false light claim as a distinct action to
eliminate overlap with defamation.73
To bring a false light claim, a plaintiff must show three elements: (1) a
false assertion, (2) that the assertion was publicized, and (3) that the false
impression would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”74 A
plaintiff must first show that a defendant made a false assertion of fact.75
A plaintiff must then show “publicity”—as opposed to “publication”—
just as one would in an action for disclosure of private facts.76 Finally, a
plaintiff must show the false impression was highly offensive to a
reasonable person—an objective standard.77 For example, a reasonable
person would not find it highly offensive that a celebrity endorsed a

68. Roe ex rel. Roe v. Heap, No. 03AP–586, 2004 WL 1109849, at *22 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11,
2004).
69. Eastwood v. Cascade Broad. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 466, 471, 722 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1986) (“A
plaintiff need not be defamed to bring a false light action: ‘It is enough that he is given unreasonable
and highly objectionable publicity that attributes to him characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are
false, and so is placed before the public in a false position.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652E cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977).
71. See Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1113 (Fla. 2008) (“Although we acknowledge
that a majority of the states have recognized the false light cause of action, we are struck by the fact
that our review of these decisions has revealed no case, nor has one been pointed out to us, in which
a judgment based solely on a false light cause of action was upheld.”).
72. Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579–80 (Tex. 1994) (“We reject the false light invasion
of privacy tort for two reasons: 1) it largely duplicates other rights of recovery, particularly
defamation; and 2) it lacks many of the procedural limitations that accompany actions for defamation,
thus unacceptably increasing the tension that already exists between free speech constitutional
guarantees and tort law.”).
73. See Cockram v. Genesco, Inc., 680 F.3d 1046, 1057 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that, under
Missouri law, a claim for false light should have been made under defamation law); Smith v. Stewart,
660 S.E.2d 822, 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (disallowing a false light claim under Georgia law when it
was “encompassed” by the plaintiff’s defamation claim).
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. L. INST. 1977).
75. Seaquist v. Caldier, 8 Wash. App. 2d 556, 565, 438 P.3d 606, 612 (2019); Zechman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1359, 1372 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
76. Peacock v. Retail Credit Co., 429 F.2d 31, 32 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[N]o claim was shown for
invasion of privacy because plaintiff failed to show any physical trespass or ‘public’ disclosure of
private facts.”); Devlin v. Greiner, 371 A.2d 380, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) (“One who
gives publicity to a matter concerning another which places the other before the public in a false light
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy . . . .”); see also infra section I.A.
77. Lemon v. Harlem Globetrotters Int’l, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1108 (D. Ariz. 2006).
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certain sports team’s apparel.78 However, falsely attributing authorship of
a tabloid article or falsely ascribing quoted material may meet this
objective standard.79
Concerning damages, plaintiffs in false light actions must show
evidence of special damages, regardless of the type of false statement that
the defendant made.80 However, for courts to award punitive damages, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with “reckless disregard of
the truth.”81
D.

Appropriation of Name or Likeness Protects the Value Associated
with the Exclusive Right to Publicize One’s Identity

The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains that a defendant “who
appropriates to [the defendant’s] own use or benefit the name or likeness
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of [the plaintiff’s]
privacy.”82 Appropriation of name or likeness is the primary focus of this
Comment. Damages vary by jurisdiction but can constitute either
pecuniary gain to the defendant from the loss,83 pecuniary damage to the

78. Id.
79. Dempsey v. Nat’l Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 934, 937 (D. Me. 1989). At particular issue in this
case, the Supreme Court held in Time, Inc. v. Hill that both defamation and false light claims under
state law require the plaintiff to demonstrate actual malice if the plaintiff is a public official. 385 U.S.
374, 386 (1967).
80. Contrast this rule to defamation cases, in which certain types of defamation (e.g., statements
that the plaintiff is a criminal) are defamatory “per se,” and require no proof of special damages; this
rule does not apply to false light claims. See Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321, 323 (Ala.
1961); Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 162 P.2d 133, 136–37 (Ariz. 1945); Fairfield v. Am.
Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243,
250 (Fla. 1944); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 59 (N.C. 1938); Sutherland v. Kroger
Co., 110 S.E.2d 716, 722–23 (W. Va. 1959).
81. Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 245 (1974).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. L. INST. 1977).
83. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2021) (allowing for $750 minimum statutory
damages, harm from the unauthorized use, or from profits from the unauthorized use that are
attributable to the use and not taken into account in computing actual damages); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 1075/40(a) (West 2020) (allowing for the greater of $1,000 statutory damages or actual
damages, profits derived from the unauthorized use, or both); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-10(1) (West
2021) (allowing for the greater of $1,000 statutory damages or actual damages, including profits
derived from the unauthorized use); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1106(d)(1) (West 2021) (allowing for
actual damages suffered as a result of the infringement and profits attributable to such use); TEXAS
PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.013(a) (West 2021) (allowing for the greater of damages sustained or $2,500,
plus profits from unauthorized use, exemplar damages, and attorneys’ fees); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 995.50(1) (West 2021) (allowing for injunctive relief, compensatory damages based on the
defendant’s profits or the plaintiff’s harm, and attorneys’ fees).
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plaintiff’s reputation, 84 or the market value of the unauthorized use.85
Some treatises have compared the rationale behind such damages to that
of trademark infringement.86 Specifically, unlike other privacy torts that
protect a person’s reputation or personal comfort, appropriation of
likeness claims protect the value of the exclusive right to publicize one’s
identity. 87
1.

The Elements of an Appropriation of Name or Likeness Claim

A plaintiff bringing an appropriation of name or likeness claim must
demonstrate that a defendant (1) used the plaintiff’s identity (2) for some
purpose or benefit to the defendant.88 First, although most cases describe
appropriation of “name or likeness,” they typically refer to the misuse of
a plaintiff’s identity.89 One may freely change their name to Jonathan Van
Ness, Tan France, Karamo Brown, or Bobby Berk.90 But using those
individual’s identities for some benefit would be actionable.91
Second, the defendant’s use must be for some purpose or benefit to the
defendant. Most appropriation claims involve commercial benefits to the
defendant.92 A benefit is “commercial” if it advances some business or
financial interest.93 For example, New Jersey does not allow appropriation
84. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 1992) (awarding damages for both
injury to goodwill and the current market value of the use), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014); Big Seven Music Corp. v. Lennon,
554 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (awarding damages for value of injury to reputation from use with
inferior merchandise); Clark v. Celeb Pub., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979, 983–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (awarding
damages for the diminished value of plaintiff’s services as a model resulting from defendant’s use of
her photograph in a pornographic magazine).
85. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 11-69 (2d ed. 2005).
86. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-30 to -31 (appropriation of likeness is analogous to
the body of law on measuring damages for the infringement of other forms of “intellectual property”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1995) (citing directly to
analogous rules to trademark damages).
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977); see also James v.
Bob Ross Buick, Inc., 855 N.E.2d 119, 122 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the tort action for
appropriation essentially affords a civil remedy for forgery).
88. JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 412, 432; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt.
a, b (AM. L. INST. 1977).
89. JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 413.
90. See id. Jonathan Van Ness, Tan France, Karamo Brown, and Bobby Berk are celebrity hosts of
the Netflix reality show, Queer Eye.
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977); see also James,
855 N.E.2d at 123 (distinguishing “the mere incidental use of a person’s name and likeness, which is
not actionable, from appropriation of the benefits associated with the person’s identity, which is”
(quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ohio 1976))).
92. JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 432.
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1995).
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claims unless the plaintiff can prove a commercial benefit to the
defendant.94 Indeed, Jeffries v. Whitney E. Houston Academy P.T.A.95 held
that an appropriation claim was not actionable when the defendant filmed
students at an elementary school because there was no evidence that the
defendant received a commercial benefit.96 Generally, misappropriation
actions that do not involve some commercial benefit to the defendant
involve impersonating someone to induce others to disclose confidential
information.97
Regardless of whether states require a personal or commercial benefit,
the law treats the exclusive right to publicize one’s identity like a property
right. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, for example, explicitly treats
the exclusive right to publicize one’s identity like a property right.98 For
example, if an electronics company creates a television advertisement
featuring a figure meant to resemble Vanna White on the set of Wheel of
Fortune, then the electronics company has misappropriated White’s
likeness.99
The American Law Institute drafted its explanation of the right of
publicity in 1977 to cover both commercial and noncommercial uses of a
plaintiff’s name or likeness.100 Courts cite this rule in both instances. But
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition—a legal treatise that
focuses specifically on commercial tort law—provides more recent
guidance: “One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s
identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other
indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief
[of injunctive relief and monetary relief].”101

94. Jeffries v. Whitney E. Houston Acad. P.T.A., No. A-1888-08T3, 2009 WL 2136174, at *2 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 20, 2009).
95. Id. at *4.
96. Id.; see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004–05 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[Some] courts, citing
their concern for free expression, have refused to extend the right of publicity to bar the use of a
celebrity’s name in the title and text of a fictional or semi-fictional book or movie.”).
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b, illus. 3 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
98. Id. § 652C cmt. a (The right of publicity “is in the nature of a property right.”).
99. This was the subject of an actual case in White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395,
1396 (9th Cir. 1992). White’s claim survived summary judgment because she alleged sufficient facts
showing that Samsung appropriated her identity through its “Vanna White” ad. Id. at 1399. For further
examples, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. L. INST. 1977).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977)
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. L. INST. 1995). For an
explanation of damages, see id. §§ 48–49.
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Damage Calculation in an Appropriation of Name or Likeness
Claim

Generally, the appropriation tort protects the value of one’s identity
rather than the identity itself.102 Accordingly, the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition describes damage awards in a commercial
appropriation of likeness claim as (a) “the pecuniary loss to the other
caused by the appropriation,” or (b) the defendant’s “own pecuniary gain
resulting from the appropriation, whichever is greater.”103 Some states
provide for minimum statutory recovery.104 While some plaintiffs are
awarded damages based on their pecuniary loss through the defendant’s
use,105 most are awarded damages valued at the benefit to the defendant
of the unauthorized use (i.e., the “market value” of the unauthorized
use).106
a.

The Rationale Behind Damage Calculation in an Appropriation of
Name or Likeness Claim

Generally, the appropriation tort does not protect one’s identity per se;
it rather protects the value associated with that identity. 107 The defendant
generally “must have appropriated to [the defendant’s] own use or benefit
the reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest or
other values of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”108 Accordingly,
compensatory damage to the value of one’s identity appears consistent
with longstanding tort principles that compensate victims for harm.109
The defendant’s increase in profits from impermissibly using the
plaintiff’s identity is often justified as “a means of deterring infringement
and recapturing gains attributable to wrongful conduct.”110 Because the
defendant’s gains may not equal the plaintiff’s pecuniary loss, “an award
102. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1010 (N.H. 2003); see also Dwyer v. Am.
Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49(1) (AM. L. INST. 1995)
104. See sources cited supra note 23 and accompanying text.
105. See cases cited supra note 84.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 (AM. L. INST. 1995) (citing Nat’l Bank
of Com. v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp.
876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, No. C 299149, 1986 WL 215081 (Cal. Super. Ct.
June 3, 1986); Alonso v. Parfet, 325 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. 1985); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1966)).
107. Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1010; see also Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1351.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977)
109. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1995).
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of the defendant’s profits can result in a windfall to the plaintiff.”111 But
the fact that plaintiffs make no profit from their identity—either because
they lack the desire or wherewithal to do so—may not justify denying
plaintiffs damages for unjust enrichment.112 Thus, plaintiffs have the
option to recover for a defendant’s profits.
b.

Injury to the Plaintiff’s Personal or Commercial Interests Caused
by the Appropriation

Ordinarily, plaintiffs may recover for damage to both their commercial
and personal interests caused by the defendant’s misappropriation.113 For
example, after a publisher impermissibly used an actress’s photographs in
a “low quality and very explicit pornographic magazine,” the court
awarded the actress damages for both her mental anguish and economic
injury to her proprietary interest in her identity due to the unauthorized
use.114 The court considered ridicule by friends and family, sleep loss, and
mental anguish, as well as harm to her business associations and ability to
work in her profession.115 Similarly, when an automobile association used
the identity of an accident victim (who was the wife of a well-known tire
salesman) for sales purposes without the victim’s permission, the victim
was not barred from recovering for both commercial and emotional
harm.116
Damage to the plaintiff’s interests most commonly involves damage to
the plaintiff’s professional standing or publicity value.117 For example, the
defendant’s service or product may be shoddy or inconsistent with the
plaintiff’s cultivated personal image; the plaintiff may have already
licensed their identity for competing goods, and the defendant’s use may
foreclose that field from additional licensing opportunities; the
defendant’s use may dilute the plaintiff’s reputation, depreciating any
endorsement value; or the defendant may associate a plaintiff’s name with

111. Id.
112. See MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-82 to -83; see also Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 438 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that plaintiffs should be entitled to profits unjustly reaped by defendants in a
misappropriation case, even where the plaintiffs may not have commercially exploited their likenesses
themselves).
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1995).
114. Clark v. Celeb Pub., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979, 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In that case, Lynda Clark,
a model and actress, sued Celeb Publishing, Inc., a “low quality and very explicit pornographic
magazine.” Id.
115. This case was complicated by the fact that the plaintiff suffered severe weight loss due to
mental anguish after the defendant’s actions, which likely further impaired her ability to model. Id.
116. Candebat v. Flanagan, 487 So. 2d 207, 209, 212 (Miss. 1986).
117. MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-78.
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a product or service that is socially or politically unpopular.118 In one case,
a plaintiff’s ostensible association with inferior merchandise caused harm
to the fair market value of the plaintiff’s reputation; accordingly, the court
awarded compensation for that harm.119 In another case, a made-up
endorsement or association with additional products diluted the market
value of the plaintiff’s identity, for which the court allowed
compensation.120 For example, the introductory hypothetical exemplifies
how damage to Aniston’s reputation could occur if Sally’s shampoo is of
low quality or damages consumers’ hair. Damage to a plaintiff’s
professional standing or publicity value can thus be recoverable in most
states.
c.

Pecuniary Gain to the Defendant

Several states explicitly allow a plaintiff to recover a defendant’s
profits from the appropriation as an “ordinarily available” remedy.121
States that have codified this remedy include California,122 Illinois,123
Indiana,124 Tennessee,125 Texas,126 and Wisconsin.127 Even in states where
such recovery is not codified, recovering the infringer’s profits is typically
open to plaintiffs under state common law, as long as there is no double
recovery with pecuniary loss.128 Similar to copyright law, a plaintiff can
often recover the defendant’s profits (or “unjust enrichment”) even if the
defendant more efficiently uses the plaintiff’s likeness than the plaintiff.129
For example, when a business used an unauthorized poster of Elvis
Presley to bolster sales, the court granted the plaintiff “an amount equal
to the profits received by the defendant from the unauthorized sale of the
‘IN MEMORY’ poster,” even though the award may have constituted “a
windfall in the form of profits from the use of Presley’s name and

118. Id. (citing Douglass v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985); Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979)).
119. Big Seven Music Corp. v. Lennon, 554 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1977).
120. Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 129; see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 434 (Cal.
1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
121. MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-81.
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2021).
123. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/40(a)(1) (West 2020).
124. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-10(1)(B) (West 2021).
125. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1106(d)(1) (West 2021).
126. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.013(a)(2) (West 2021).
127. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50(1)(b) (West 2021).
128. MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-82.
129. Id. (citing Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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likeness.”130
d.

The Market Value of the Appropriation

Rather than compensating for the plaintiff’s loss or defendant’s gain,
several courts have compensated plaintiffs based on the marketplace value
of the property right that the defendant appropriated.131 Specifically, these
courts awarded the fair market value of using the plaintiff’s image had the
plaintiff and defendant negotiated for the right before the use.132 For
example, when an infringer falsely claimed that a celebrity endorsed her
product, a court ascertained the market value of the endorsement through
expert testimony as to the amount paid to comparable celebrities for
comparable endorsements.133 Hearkening back to the introductory
example, if a court finds that Aniston could have demanded five-hundred
thousand dollars in a deal to endorse Sally’s shampoo, then the court
would probably award Aniston five-hundred thousand dollars in damages
under this regime.
Even for noncelebrities, one’s persona value can be a quantifiable
question for a trier of fact.134 For example, one court awarded a three-yearold child $100 for misappropriation because a modeling fee for a child
with a similarly “endearing appearance” would have received a similar
sum.135 As will be discussed in more detail below, this method of
awarding damages contributes to the most optimal outcomes.
3.

Comparison to Trademark Damages

Commentators often justify damage calculation in appropriation of
likeness claims through comparison to trademark infringement actions.136
130. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1093–104 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev’d on
other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
131. MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-83.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of Com. v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp 533, 546–47 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
(explaining that plaintiff and defendant each presented expert testimony as to the commercial
licensing value of plaintiff’s persona); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(“[T]he Court can take judicial notice that there is a fairly active market for exploitation of the faces,
names and reputations of celebrities, and such market—like any other—must have its recognized
rules and experts.”); see also James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and
Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 651 (1973) (stating that a plaintiff can prove the value of
their identity by reference to the current market rate for endorsements of celebrities of similar stature).
134. MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-70 to -71.
135. Bowling v. Missionary Servants of Most Holy Trinity, 972 F.2d 346, *5 (6th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished table decision).
136. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1995)
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In trademark cases, plaintiffs are statutorily entitled to a defendant’s
profits, yet courts imply a willfulness requirement to prevent inequitable
windfall gains.137 The Trademark Act of 1946138 states that once a plaintiff
proves infringement, “the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . subject to the
principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages
sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.”139 However,
most courts will not award a defendant’s profits unless the plaintiff can
show that a defendant intentionally infringed the plaintiff’s trademark.140
These courts are concerned that awarding a defendant’s profits “may
overcompensate for a plaintiff’s actual injury and create a windfall
judgment at the defendant’s expense.”141 As this Comment seeks to
establish, these arguments against generous trademark infringement
awards can and should be applied when awarding damages for
misappropriation claims.
Windfall awards in trademark cases tend to occur when a money
judgment is based on some proportion of the defendant’s revenue rather
than the plaintiff’s injury.142 Often the judgment amount in trademark
cases depends more on “the efficiency of the infringing operation than the
injury to the trademark owner or culpability of the infringer.”143
Accordingly, many courts expressly limit damages based on defendant
profits when the defendant did not intentionally infringe the plaintiff’s
(“[I]t is widely assumed that the defendant’s profits are an appropriate measure of relief in right of
publicity cases under rules analogous to the recovery of profits in trademark, trade secret, and
copyright cases.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-80 to -81 (analogizing to the “large body of law
on measuring damages for the infringement of other forms of ‘intellectual property’: patents,
trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets”).
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1995);
MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-80 to -81; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 136 cmt. a
(AM. L. INST. 1937).
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127.
139. Id. § 1117(a).
140. George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1540 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing ALPO
Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v.
Elby’s Big Boy, 849 F.2d 1012, 1015 (6th Cir. 1988); Schroeder v. Lotito, 747 F.2d 801, 802 (1st Cir.
1984)).
141. George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1540.
142. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 934 F. Supp. 425, 427 (S.D. Fla. 1996)
(awarding $1,259,663 from the defendant’s profits even though the plaintiff sought no actual
damages); Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 84 C 8075, 1993 WL 204092, at *7
(N.D. Ill. June 8, 1993) (exercising discretion under the Trademark Act of 1964 to award double
royalties, totaling $26,656,822), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 34 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1994), aff’d on
reh’g, 44 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (affirming trial court’s award of double royalties);
Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1376 (10th Cir. 1977)
(affirming award of over four million dollars based on a portion of the defendant’s advertising costs).
143. Mark A. Thurmon, Confusion Codified: Why Trademark Remedies Make No Sense, 17 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 248 (2010).
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trademark.144 As some commentators point out, courts impose this
limitation for the sake of “equity,” even though the statutory language
does not—at least in express terms—allow for this limitation.145
Though judges and commentators often justify compensation for a
defendant’s profits in appropriation of likeness claims through
comparison to trademark violation actions, this comparison is
imperfect.146 Admittedly, the exclusive right to a trademark is like the
exclusive right to use one’s name or likeness—the protected value comes
from recognizability and associated goodwill.147 However, trademark
rights differ in important ways. First, entities typically create and use
trademarks to develop and maintain goodwill.148 In contrast, a person does
not typically create a name or image from whole cloth.149 Second, if a
brand loses sufficient goodwill, the trademark holder can throw out the
brand and use a different brand more easily than people can throw out and
recreate their identity.150 For example, after harsh criticism over
destroying the environment, British Petroleum rebranded itself as
“Beyond Petroleum” and replaced its more imposing logo with a greentinted flower.151 By contrast, a disgraced public figure may have more
difficulty recouping goodwill by changing their name and appearance.
Third, a trademark can theoretically last forever if its owner meets post-

144. George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1540 (citing ALPO Petfoods, Inc., 913 F.2d at 968; Frisch’s
Rests., Inc., 849 F.2d at 1015; Schroeder, 747 F.2d at 802).
145. Thurmon, supra note 143, at 249; Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark
Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in Awarding an Accounting of Defendant’s Profits, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 863, 864 (2002).
146. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1995);
MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-80 to -81; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 136 cmt. a
(AM. L. INST. 1937).
147. See Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982) (citation omitted)
(“[T]he infringer deprives the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and money to
obtain. At the same time, the infringer deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish among the
goods of competing manufacturers.”).
148. Philipp G. Sandner & Joern Block, The Market Value of R&D, Patents, and Trademarks, 40
RSCH. POL’Y 969, 970–71 (2011).
149. While a myriad of celebrities use stage names, an individual’s identity may be more difficult
to create from whole cloth than an inanimate product brand.
150. See Steve Olenski, Nearly Four Years After Deepwater Horizon, Has BP’s Brand Image
Recovered?, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2014, 12:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveolenski/2014/01
/24/nearly-four-years-after-deepwater-horizon-has-bps-brand-image-recovered/?sh=74a1fb8561f6
[https://perma.cc/4XY7-CXHN].
151. See Scott Carpenter, After Abandoned ‘Beyond Petroleum’ Re-Brand, BP’s New Renewables
Push Has Teeth, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2020, 1:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottcarpenter/202
0/08/04/bps-new-renewables-push-redolent-of-abandoned-beyond-petroleum-rebrand/?sh=e94023f1
ceb3 [https://perma.cc/8ETM-8URU].
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registration maintenance requirements.152 In contrast, the right to
exclusively use a person’s likeness after death is limited in most states.
For example, New York only protects the right of publicity for “any living
person.”153 Other states only protect the right of publicity after a person’s
death if the person exploited that publicity during life.154 States that allow
the right of publicity to be inherited after one’s death limit the right’s
duration.155
Some argue for limiting trademark damage awards for the defendant’s
pecuniary gain to instances in which the defendant intentionally
appropriated the plaintiff’s likeness.156 Specifically, awarding a
defendant’s profits to the plaintiff may create a windfall gain for the
plaintiff and such a windfall gain may only be useful to deter such conduct
rather than compensate the plaintiff.157 As will be explained below, this
reasoning may apply to appropriation of likeness claims.
II.

RECOGNIZABILITY SHOULD BE CONCEPTUALIZED AS
“CAPITAL” THAT APPRECIATES RECIPROCALLY WITH
ATTENTION

In the introductory example, if Sally misappropriates Aniston’s
“likeness” for commercial benefit, then what exactly is Aniston’s asset
that Sally capitalized upon? This Comment suggests that Aniston’s
“likeness” in a misappropriation claim is synonymous with Aniston’s
recognizability. Recognizability should be conceptualized as economic
capital. Whereas traditional, tangible capital (such as equipment in a
manufacturing plant) increases by creating goods and services to sell to
create more capital, recognizability generates attention, which in turn
generates more recognizability. As this Comment explains,

152. What Is a Trademark?, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/abouttrademarks [https://perma.cc/6CEU-X9ZR].
153. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2021) (emphasis added).
154. See, e.g., State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 98 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1987) (concerning the survivability of the exclusive right to Elvis Presley’s publicity after
the celebrity died).
155. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103, 1004 (West 2021) (limiting the exclusive rights
of commercial exploitation after death to ten years). Because of the quantity of celebrities and public
figures who live in California, California’s law dealing with the descendability of the right to publicity
is particularly important. California does not allow a person’s heirs exclusive rights to her likeness
unless she exercised the rights during her life, and even then state law limits the use to seventy years
after death. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(g) (West 2021).
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 136 cmt. c (AM. L. INST.
2010) (citing George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992)).
157. For example, there could be situations where defendants make better use of plaintiffs’ images
or consumers would have purchased the defendants’ products anyway.

Pardue (Do Not Delete)

1588

12/14/2021 10:07 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1567

overprotecting the exclusive right to publicize one’s identity exacerbates
companies’ appetite for consumer attention and commodifies the
consumer’s time.
The classic model of commodification examines the dichotomy
between an item’s “use-value” and “exchange-value.”158 An item’s use
value describes the direct benefit to a person; an item’s exchange value
describes how much one can exchange the item for. The new field of
“attention economics” describes the way that consumer attention is
commodified; there is a finite amount of attention that the consumer can
devote to entertainment sources that advertisers can then exploit.159
Accordingly, time and attention become objects of exchange, rather than
something valuable unto themselves. Further, consumers devote more
attention to public figures the more recognizable these public figures are.
Recognizability thereby directly contributes to a public figure’s (e.g., a
movie star, professional athlete, social media influencer) financial value.
In turn, public figures with higher brand value secure greater opportunities
that yield more consumer attention. This creates a recognizabilityattention feedback loop similar to the capital-commodity feedback loop
contemplated by classical economists.
A.

The Classic Model of “Commodification” Conceptualizes the
Production of Something for Its Exchange Value

Classic literature about commodification emphasizes the relationship
between land, labor, and money.160 In emphasizing the difference between
“use value” (a thing’s inherent benefit or use) and “exchange value” (what
one can exchange for a thing), Adam Smith famously noted that
“[n]obody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone
for another with another dog.”161 Smith argued that reducing goods to their
exchange value allows workers to specialize and divide their labor,
increasing efficiency and total productive output. 162 Vindicating Smith,
many scholars in subsequent centuries noted that the market economy

158. ROBERT HEILBRONER, TEACHINGS FROM THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHY 162–63 (1996)
[hereinafter HEILBRONER, TEACHINGS].
159. Infra section II.B.
160. This Comment, in accordance with classical economic literature, refers to “commodities” as
things produced for exchange rather than for immediate use. HEILBRONER, TEACHINGS, supra note
158.
161. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 15
(S.M. Soares ed., MetaLibri 2007) (1776).
162. Id. at 16–17.
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“pushes towards the commodification of everything.”163 Further, the
historical tendency for “all use-values to submit to the commodity-form
and to convert simple commodity production to capitalist commodity
production wherever and whenever it can” provides a useful model for the
commodifying attention.164
Specifically, classical economists wrote about the surplus-value
creation’s seemingly contradictory nature.165 For example, capital
invariably takes the form at first as money; “money that is capital, is
nothing more than a difference in their form of circulation.”166 An
economic circulation model is broadly represented by commodities (“C”)
transforming into money (“M”)—taking the form of either liquid assets
or capital ownership—which transforms again into commodities. One can
represent this progression as C-M-C.167“But alongside this form we find
another specifically different form: M-C-M, the transformation of money
into commodities, and the change of commodities back again into money;
or buying in order to sell.”168 The surprising result is that the second M,
or “M′” (“M prime”), in this M-C-M′ form of production is larger than the
first M; entrepreneurs do not invest money into a business unless they
expect a greater return than their initial investment.169 However, where
does the increase in M come from?
Classical economists were split between physiocracy, which
emphasizes that the environment is the source of value, and the labor
theory of value, which emphasizes that value is an embodiment of
labor.170 The former argued that “land alone yields a surplus because
nature labors with man, whereas man working with machines can do no
more than reshape the material that had originally been wrested from the
fecund soil.”171 The latter argued that “[t]he value of a commodity, or the
163. Immanuel Wallerstein, Household Structures and Labour-Force Formation in the Capitalist
World-Economy, in RACE, NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES 107, 107 (Verso 1991) (1988).
Whether this outcome is ultimately desirable is far outside the scope of this Comment.
164. JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY 25 (Univ. of Wis. Press 2d ed. 2004) (1988) (emphasis in original).
165. For perhaps the best description of classical economists and their contributions, see ROBERT
L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS (5th ed. 1980). For Robert Heilbroner’s later work
which captures useful literary excerpts of classical and modern economists, see HEILBRONER,
TEACHINGS, supra note 158.
166. HEILBRONER, TEACHINGS, supra note 158, at 168.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 168–69.
170. A full explanation of the classical theory of value is not possible here. For a more useful and
thorough explanation, see E.K. HUNT & MARK LAUTZENHEISER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT:
A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE (M.E. Sharpe 3d ed. 2011) (1979).
171. HEILBRONER, TEACHINGS, supra note 158, at 35.
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quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends on
the relative quantity of labour which is necessary for its production, and
not on the greater or less compensation which is paid for that labour.”172
Adequately discussing the source of this increase is outside this
Comment’s purview. But regardless of what causes the increase in M,
“[t]he circulation of money as capital is . . . an end in itself, for the
expansion of value takes place only within this constantly renewed
movement. The circulation [and expansion] of capital has therefore no
limits.”173
Part III applies similar reasoning to the commercial growth of a
person’s brand value as more people pay attention to them.174 Other
authors have argued that the exclusive right to publicity encourages the
commodification of fame.175 By contrast, this Comment suggests that it is
not fame or recognizability that is commodified, but time and attention
that are commodified. Accordingly, fame and recognizability should be
conceptualized as capital that seeks to grow in a limitless feedback look
with time and attention.
B.

The Field of “Attention Economics” Describes How Consumer
Attention Is Commodified and Sold to Advertisers

“Attention economics” is an approach to information management that
treats human attention as a scarce commodity and applies economic
theory to solve information management problems.176 As will be
discussed in section II.D,177 attention can be described as a commodity
that increases the degree and value of a person’s recognizability. Part III
discusses the business of capturing consumer attention and the
opportunity costs on the consumer’s time.178
“Attention” in this field “is focused mental engagement on a particular
item of information. Items come into our awareness, we attend to a
172. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 8 (Batoche
Books 3d ed. 2001) (1817).
173. HEILBRONER, TEACHINGS, supra note 158, at 168.
174. Infra section III.B
175. See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 177 (1993) (“In the last decade or two, as the ‘celebrity industry’ has
grown in power, organization, and sophistication, and as the costs involved in celebrity production
have soared, the pressure for legal commodification of personas has intensified.” (footnote omitted)).
176. See generally THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & JOHN C. BECK, THE ATTENTION ECONOMY:
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CURRENCY OF BUSINESS 2 (2001) (“In this new economy, capital, labor,
information, and knowledge are all in plentiful supply. . . . What’s in short supply is human
attention.”).
177. Infra section II.D.
178. Infra Part III.

Pardue (Do Not Delete)

2021]

12/14/2021 10:07 PM

YOU ARE NOT A COMMODITY

1591

particular item, and then we decide whether to act.”179 Under this
approach, attention is a scarce resource and becomes the limiting factor in
information consumption. Herbert Simon, an early writer about attention
economics, noted that “in an information-rich world, the wealth of
information means a dearth of something else . . . . [A] wealth of
information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that
attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that
might consume it.”180
Advertisers’ seemingly limitless appetite for consumer attention is
particularly salient when considering the business model of social media
giants. For example, Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and other major
platforms are free to users because users are not the customers—they are
the commodity. These platforms tend toward an infinite appetite for
consumer attention because consumer attention is the commodity sold to
advertisers.181 As explained in more detail below, attention economics is
relevant to social media influencers because they compete for user
attention to sell that attention to marketers.182
C.

Recognition and Attachment Contribute to Financial Value

Attention often leads to attachment. “Attachment theory” explains
interpersonal bonds that connect the individual with a specific target.183
As will be discussed in section II.D, attention can be described as a
commodity that increases the degree and value of a person’s
recognizability. Section II.D discusses the mechanism by which this
relationship occurs.
Attachment to a person or object impacts an individual’s allocation of
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral resources to that person or object.184
Market researchers model the consumer-brand relationship as emotional

179. DAVENPORT & BECK, supra note 176, at 20.
180. Herbert A. Simon, Richard King Mellon Professor of Comput. Sci. & Psych., CarnegieMellon Univ., Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, in COMPUTERS,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 40–41 (M. Greenberger ed., 1971).
181. JAMES G. WEBSTER, THE MARKETPLACE OF ATTENTION: HOW AUDIENCES TAKE SHAPE IN A
DIGITAL AGE 1–5 (2014); see also JIM STERNE, SOCIAL MEDIA METRICS: HOW TO MEASURE AND
OPTIMIZE YOUR MARKETING INVESTMENT 19–25 (2010) (discussing strategies for advertisers to
maximize visibility through social media).
182. Infra section II.D.
183. See John Bowlby, The Making and Breaking of Affectional Bonds, 130 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY
201, 201 (1977).
184. John G. Holmes, Social Relationships: The Nature and Function of Relational Schemas, 30
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 447 (2000).
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attachment.185 In the fan-celebrity context, “once a fan develops an
attachment to a celebrity, [the fan’s] proximity-seeking system will be
activated as if [the fan] is in a relationship with a child or a romantic
partner.”186 This is why “fans can spend hours looking at the celebrity’s
photographs and videos, collecting memorabilia, and becoming
passionate consumers of the celebrity’s work.”187 Attention toward a
public figure may create a positive feedback loop with attachment to and
recognition of that public figure.
Market research demonstrates a bilateral causal link between attention
and attachment.188 And when a consumer is attached to an individual or
perceives a shared identity with an individual, this individual’s opinion
can influence a consumer’s evaluation of and demand for a product or
service.189 Accordingly, marketers can hijack a consumer’s attachment to
a public figure (such as a celebrity or influencer) and create an attachment
to a product.190 For example, in an interview with National Public Radio
(NPR), leading market researcher Americus Reed described his firsthand
experience with the way marketers hijack attachment to a persona to
create an attachment for a product.191 Reed, a Lance Armstrong fan,
purchased Armstrong’s signature yellow bracelet, Armstrong’s signature

185. Much literature is devoted to brand attachment and its influence on consumer purchases. See,
e.g., C. Whan Park, Deborah J. Macinnis, Joseph Priester, Andreas B. Eisingerich & Dawn Iacobucci,
Brand Attachment and Brand Attitude Strength: Conceptual and Empirical Differentiation of Two
Critical Brand Equity Drivers, 74 J. MKTG. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Brand Attachment and Brand
Attitude Strength] (discussing brand attachment and its predictive value on consumer behavior);
Alexander Fedorikhin, C. Whan Park & Matthew Thomson, Beyond Fit and Attitude: The Effect of
Emotional Attachment on Consumer Responses to Brand Extensions, 18 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 281
(2008) (showing that brand attachment contributes to consumers’ behavioral reactions to brand
extensions such as purchase intentions, willingness to pay, word-of-mouth, and forgiveness); FranzRudolf Esch, Tobias Langner, Bernd H. Schmitt & Patrick Geus, Are Brands Forever? How Brand
Knowledge and Relationships Affect Current and Future Purchases, 15 J. PROD. & BRAND MGMT.
98 (2006) (showing that brand knowledge and brand relationship contribute to consumer purchase
decisions).
186. Jinlin Wan, Yaobin Lu, Bin Wang & Ling Zhao, How Attachment Influences Users’
Willingness to Donate to Content Creators in Social Media: A Socio-Technical Systems Perspective,
54 INFO. & MGMT. 837, 839 (2017) (citing Gayle S. Stever, Fan Behavior and Lifespan Development
Theory: Explaining Para-social and Social Attachment to Celebrities, 18 J. ADULT DEV. 1 (2011)).
187. Id.
188. Brand Attachment and Brand Attitude Strength, supra note 185, at 1–3.
189. David B. Wooten & Americus Reed II, Informational Influence and the Ambiguity of Product
Experience: Order Effects on the Weighting of Evidence, 7 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 79, 80 (1998).
190. Americus Reed II, Mark R. Forehand, Stefano Puntoni & Luk Warlop, Identity-Based
Consumer Behavior, 29 INT’L J. RSCH. MKTG. 310, 315 (2012).
191. Hidden Brain, I Buy, Therefore I Am: How Brands Become Part of Who We Are, NPR (July
1, 2019, 5:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/28/736942500/i-buy-therefore-i-am-how-brandsbecome-part-of-who-we-are [https://perma.cc/5EDA-CUBS] (transcript available at https://www.
npr.org/transcripts/736942500 [https://perma.cc/22JF-FJBN]).
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cycling uniform, and even the bicycle brand that Armstrong used.192
“[L]ike a lot of people, I connected with the Lance Armstrong brand. . . . I
would be out there, and I would be channeling Lance Armstrong. I would
think about Lance Armstrong in the mountains. And it was, for me, deeply
emotional.”193
Reed’s research describes the relationship between identity,
attachment, and personal brand.194 Specifically, Reed describes how
marketers use influential personalities to create a worldview around the
products they sell and create attachment based on consumer attachment to
these personalities.195 Reed notes that harm to a public figure’s reputation
in any form can lead to harm to their brand value. For example, after news
broke of Tiger Woods’s infidelity, Woods’s endorsement value dropped
significantly.196 While his infidelity did not have any effect on the usevalue (i.e., the effectiveness in a game of golf) of the golfing equipment
he endorsed, consumers had formed an attachment to Woods and felt
betrayed by his actions. Accordingly, the value of Woods’s endorsements
dropped significantly overnight.197 Similarly, Reed notes that when news
broke of Lance Armstrong’s doping, he experienced a feeling like losing
a close friend: “I felt foolish. I felt like I was a fool in that relationship
with his brand because I was trying to reinforce and express all of these
values that turned out not to be true.”198 In short, consumer attachment to
a persona can be deeply and causally connected to the products and
services used by that persona. When capitalized, this attachment can have
significant economic value.
D.

Personal Branding Contributes to the Commodification of
Attention and the Accumulation of Recognizability

The classic commodification model may be useful to analyze personal
branding and what exactly is harmed when a tortfeasor appropriates a
victim’s identity. Three examples are discussed below. First, a highly
recognizable actor is important to the funding and success of a movie or
television show. Second, the popularity of a singer contributes to the

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Amit Bhattacharjee, Jonathan Z. Berman & Americus Reed II, Tip of the Hat, Wag of the
Finger: How Moral Decoupling Enables Consumers to Admire and Admonish, 39 J. CONSUMER
RSCH. 1167, 1168 (2013).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1179–80.
197. Id.
198. Reed, supra note 191.
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popularity of new songs. Such recognizability (which contributes to the
market value of “likeness”) grows as consumers pay more attention to
these people through watching their films and listening to their music.
Third, social media influencers build their recognizability and follower
attention and sell that attention through product use or endorsement.
As recognizability grows, personal brands become more marketable for
additional projects. As classic economics applied the M-C-M′ model to
the accumulation of surplus-value, one can conceptualize the increase in
recognizability (“R”) from attention (“A”) as “R-A-R′.” But unlike the
increase from M to M′ contemplated by commodification theory, the
increase from R to R′ does not come from exploiting the environment or
labor; this increase comes from exploiting consumer attention. The field
of “attention economics” instructs that attention is a finite resource;
cognitive resources are scarce, so consuming one unit of media
necessarily means a dearth of something else. Accordingly, to exploit
attention is to exploit the consumer’s time.199
1.

Celebrities’ Audience-Recognition Positively Impacts the Success
and Audience Attention of Their Work

Employing highly recognizable actors contributes substantially to a
film’s or television show’s funding and success; thus, producers strongly
prefer recognizable actors.200 “The conventional wisdom is that one needs
a well-known actor—a ‘star’—for a successful deal.”201 After a film’s
release, some research suggests that “the director and actors/actresses
involved in a film are the most important factors to its success or lack
thereof.”202 This is not to suggest that cast recognition is the most
important variable in determining box-office success; indeed, some
research suggests that other factors impact film success more than cast
recognition.203 But highly recognizable actors contribute to a film’s initial
199. This Comment does not use “exploit” pejoratively. Workers presumably consent to their
employment, so to “exploit” labor does not necessarily mean to take advantage of the laborer or to
make her worse off. Moreover, (recent neuroscientific insights concerning attention economics aside)
consumers presumably consent to and benefit from the time they spend consuming media.
200. See John Yudelson, The Impact of Actors and Producers in Studio-Financed Movie Deals, 3
J. BEHAV. STUD. BUS. 4, 12 (2011), https://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/10698.pdf [https://perma.c
c/42J9-TQPA] (applying centering resonance analysis, Yudelson concludes that producers are more
important to a film being produced, but that actors play a key role).
201. Id. at 1.
202. M. Saraee, S. White & J. Eccleston, A Data Mining Approach to Analysis and Prediction of
Movie Ratings, in DATA MINING V 343, 343 (A. Zanasi, N.F.F. Ebecken & C.A. Brebbia eds., 2004).
203. Steven Albert, Movie Stars and the Distribution of Financially Successful Films in the Motion
Picture Industry, 22 J. CULTURAL ECON. 249, 250–51 (1998) (using multiple regression analysis,
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funding and its eventual box-office success. This leads to more attention
toward these actors, fostering a feedback loop of increasing
recognizability.
Additionally, this relationship between recognition and attention
impacts the music industry. It is not surprising that a musician’s popularity
contributes substantially to album sales.204 And “the amount of talk on
Facebook about the band around the time of album release”—that is, the
amount of attention already accumulated on social media—is a strong
indicator of album sales.205 Attention begets recognition, which begets
more attention.
Admittedly, consumer attention is not a one-dimensional variable. For
example, an actor who is prolific in raunchy comedy films may have
difficulty breaking into historical dramas. And this difficulty may stem
from the actor’s reputation and recognizability. However, there is a
generally positive correlation between an actor’s recognizability and
ability to demand a high salary, notwithstanding the actor’s niche.206 And
notwithstanding a musician’s difficulty in breaking out of a niche, the
musician’s recognizability at least contributes to further album sales.207 In
general, attention toward a public figure leads to recognition of that public
figure; recognition of a public figure contributes to that public figure’s
capacity to garner attention.
2.

The Rise of Social Media Influencers Contributes to the
Commodification of Attention

Influencers are people who use their knowledge, position, or
relationship with their audience to affect consumers’ purchasing
decisions; influencers have impacted the media landscape and developed
new ways to commodify consumer attention.208 Influencer marketing is a
type of social media marketing in which individuals with a dedicated
social following sell “mentions”209 or endorsements of products and
Albert finds that actor recognition provides some predictive value of a film’s success, but that other
factors have greater predictive value).
204. Marc van der Meulen, Important Indicators in Determining Future Album Sales Success:
Designing a Model to Predict Future Album Sales (July 7, 2018) (M.B.A. thesis, Radboud University)
https://theses.ubn.ru.nl/handle/123456789/6780 [https://perma.cc/YA2C-EVBA].
205. Id. at 43.
206. See Yudelson, supra note 200, at 4.
207. See van der Meulen, supra note 204, at 42.
208. See Werner Geyser, What Is an Influencer?—Social Media Influencers Defined, INFLUENCER
MKTG. HUB (Aug. 17, 2021) [hereinafter Influencer Marketing], https://influencermarketinghub.co
m/what-is-an-influencer/ [https://perma.cc/X4PE-ECB8].
209. “Mentions” refer to referencing products in the influencer’s content.
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services.210 While paid endorsements are not new, social media platforms
have enabled a substantial increase in the practice; marketers paid
influencers an estimated eight billion dollars in 2019, and some estimates
expect that amount to increase to fifteen billion dollars by 2022.211
The number of people following an influencer determines, in large part,
how much money advertisers pay the influencer. 212 The price per post can
vary dramatically: reality TV personality Kylie Jenner, with 112 million
Instagram followers in 2018, made over $1 million per sponsored post;
pop star Beyoncé, with 116 million followers in 2018, made $700,000 per
sponsored post; actor Dwayne Johnson, with 111 million followers in
2018, made $650,000 per sponsored post.213
Admittedly, follower quantity is not the sole variable that determines
brand value—other variables impact brand value based on consumer
engagement and likelihood of connected purchases. For example,
marketers categorize influencers’ value through their “reach” and “niche”
in relation to the attention they receive from their followers.214 “Reach”
refers to an influencer’s number of followers and the followers’
engagement with the influencer’s material.215 “Niche” refers to the
specificity of an influencer’s target audience.216 For example, makeup and
style influencer Jeffree Star217 likely commands more reach than sport and

210. Jenn Chen, What Is Influencer Marketing: How to Develop Your Strategy, SPROUT SOC. (Sept.
17, 2020), https://sproutsocial.com/insights/influencer-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/47H3-P7UE].
211. Chemi Katz, How E-Commerce Brands Should Capitalize on Traffic from Social Media
Influencers, FORBES (May 5, 2021, 9:00 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/
05/05/how-e-commerce-brands-should-capitalize-on-traffic-from-social-media-influencers/?sh=421
6ba4e66b8 [https://perma.cc/5AME-44A4]; see also Influencer Marketing: Social Media Influencer
Market Stats and Research for 2021, INSIDER INTEL. (July 27, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.c
om/influencer-marketing-report [https://perma.cc/8BGH-XCLS]. While every social media platform
attracts influencers to some degree, Instagram is particularly known for product placement and
endorsement activity. Id.
212. Braveen Kumar, 6 Ways to Make Money on Instagram (Whether You Have 1K or 100K
Followers), SHOPIFY BLOG (July 22, 2021), https://www.shopify.com/blog/make-money-oninstagram [https://perma.cc/C6C7-B8RY].
213. Zameena Mejia, Kylie Jenner Reportedly Makes $1 Million per Paid Instagram Post—Here’s
How Much Other Top Influencers Get, CNBC (Aug. 1, 2018, 10:33 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/20
18/07/31/kylie-jenner-makes-1-million-per-paid-instagram-post-hopper-hq-says.html [https://perma.
cc/R3SX-QWRU].
214. See Influencer Marketing, supra note 211.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Jeffree Star (@jeffreestar), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/jeffreestar/?hl=en
(last visited Oct. 16, 2021); Jeffree Star (@JeffreeStar), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/jeffreestar (last
visited Oct. 16, 2021).
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fitness influencer Massy Arias,218 but it would be more effective for a
company that sells running shoes to market with the latter due to her niche.
And while influencers in different niches ostensibly do not compete for
attention, they are not drawing from an infinite resource.219 In theory,
there is an upward limit to the amount of attention that a set number of
consumers can give.220
Like Ms. Moneybags, the factory owner who turns money into capital,
and capital into more money, influencers turn their recognizability into
attention, which contributes to more recognizability (R-A-R′). There is no
such thing as a free lunch—recognizability does not exist without an
audience to give its attention. Accordingly, influencers exploit attention
to increase their recognizability and commodify attention by selling it to
advertisers.
III. AWARDING DEFENDANT PROFITS AS DAMAGES LEADS
TO SUBOPTIMAL INCENTIVES AND ENCOURAGES
ATTENTION COMMODIFICATION
Awarding plaintiffs who bring appropriation of likeness actions with
the defendants’ profits provides windfall gains to plaintiffs. This
disincentivizes otherwise efficient uses of publicity, overcompensates
plaintiffs, and thereby leads to inefficient outcomes. Further,
overprotecting the right to exclusive publicity likely aids advertisers in
commodifying consumer attention. Specifically, public personalities sell
consumer time and attention to advertisers; public personalities can do
this in part because of their recognizability. Overprotecting their
recognizability thereby encourages attention commodification. Finally,
instances in which misappropriation should be more generously
compensated are better brought under different privacy claims.
A.

Awarding Defendant Profits as Damages Provides Windfall Gains
to the Plaintiff, Which Leads to Inefficient Outcomes

Many courts have recognized that awarding damages based on
defendants’ profits may result in windfall gains to plaintiffs.221 Generally,
218. See Massy Arias (@massy.arias), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/massy.arias/?hl
=en (last visited Oct. 16, 2021); Massy Arias (@mankofit), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/mankofit?l
ang=en (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
219. DAVENPORT & BECK, supra note 176, at 2.
220. See id.
221. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1995); see
also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1093–1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev’d on
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economists consider gain to be a “windfall” if it is “not foreseen by [the
recipient] and are not in any degree due to efforts made, intelligence
exercised, risks borne, or capital invested in them.”222 Accordingly,
removing these gains should not harm the subject’s incentive to engage in
productive activity.223
In trademark cases, plaintiffs are statutorily entitled to defendants’
profits, but courts have implied additional equitable requirements to
prevent windfall gains.224 This is because generally awarding such profits
can lead to an inequitable windfall gain.225 This reasoning also applies to
misappropriation claims. However, rather than awarding a defendant’s
profits if a certain element is met, awarding exemplary damages (damages
intended to punish the wrongdoer and deter future bad behavior) would
lead to more efficient outcomes.
Suppose that Sally, the sole proprietor from the introductory
hypothetical, earns one million dollars per year producing shampoo.226
Further, suppose an endorsement deal with Aniston would cost Sally fivehundred thousand dollars but could increase net sales to two million
dollars.227 Such a deal would be rational for Sally because the resulting
increase in profits would be five-hundred thousand dollars.228 But what if
Sally added Aniston’s image to the shampoo bottles without Aniston’s
permission? Aniston could then sue Sally for appropriation of name or
likeness because Aniston could demonstrate that Sally used Aniston’s
other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831, 838 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Smith v. NBC Universal, 524 F. Supp. 2d 315,
331 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Miller v. Collectors Universe, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 194, 207 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) (concerning minimum statutory damages where actual damages were otherwise unavailable);
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 207 (1942) (applying
similar logic in the case of trademark infringement).
222. PIGOU, supra note 5, at 156; see also Windfall, supra note 5 (“An unanticipated benefit,
usu[ally] in the form of a profit and not caused by the recipient”); Economics A-Z Terms Beginning
with W, ECONOMIST [hereinafter Economics A-Z], https://www.economist.com/economics-a-toz/w#node-21529317 [https://perma.cc/S4ZF-SW9Z] (defining “windfall profit” as something
“earned unexpectedly, through circumstances beyond the control of the [subject] concerned, and is
thus deemed undeserved”).
223. Economics A-Z, supra note 222.
224. See supra section I.D.
225. See supra section III.A.
226. It’s unlikely that a shampoo manufacturer with one million dollars in annual profits would be
structured as a sole proprietorship, but I ask the reader to humor this oversimplified model.
227. This hypothetical estimate is likely conservative based on Aniston’s 2012 endorsement deal
with Aveeno. See Arielle Tschinkel, Jennifer Aniston Is Worth a Reported $240 Million—Here’s How
She Built Her Fortune, INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2019, 7:34 AM), https://www.insider.com/jennifer-anistonnet-worth-2018-12#a-lot-of-her-income-reportedly-comes-from-lucrative-endorsement-deals-5
[https://perma.cc/9WZV-ALKK].
228. One million dollars increase in sales minus the five-hundred-thousand-dollar deal.

Pardue (Do Not Delete)

2021]

12/14/2021 10:07 PM

YOU ARE NOT A COMMODITY

1599

identity for some purpose or benefit.229 In many jurisdictions, Aniston
could recover from Sally the greater of (1) pecuniary damage to Aniston’s
reputation or (2) Sally’s increase in profits from Aniston’s use.230 If
Aniston chooses the latter, then Aniston will receive one million
dollars.231 However, this yields a five-hundred-thousand-dollar windfall
to Aniston.232 Further, Sally’s additional work to provide the additional
shampoo to customers—economies of scale notwithstanding—would go
uncompensated.
By contrast, in jurisdictions that limit appropriation of likeness
damages to quantum meruit,233 Aniston would only be entitled to the fivehundred thousand dollars she would have otherwise earned had she
negotiated an endorsement deal. Sally would retain the five-hundred
thousand dollars in increased profits. Just as if Sally had negotiated with
Aniston, such a situation would economically benefit both Sally and
Aniston.234 Further, by allowing Sally to retain an additional five-hundred
thousand dollars for Sally’s efforts, Sally is appropriately awarded for
producing additional shampoo. Even aside from incentivizing Sally for
shampoo-production efforts, there is no reason that Aniston should reap
the windfall if one must be assigned. Nor should Aniston be forced to
share her advertising income with the screenwriters, directors, or
stagehands from whose work Aniston benefited—any public figure in the
rise to fame likely experienced some windfall gains already.235
Admittedly, there may be instances where Sally’s use damages
Aniston’s brand value. Further, one might find it intrinsically undesirable
(economic wellbeing notwithstanding) to allow another to use Aniston’s
image without her permission. Section III.C below addresses these
situations.236

229. See supra section I.D. Further, if the reasonable consumer is duped into thinking that Aniston
actively endorses Sally’s shampoo, and Aniston can demonstrate personal harm, Aniston may have
an additional claim for false light. See supra section I.C.
230. See supra section I.D.
231. This is the difference in Sally’s profit before and after the use.
232. One million in increased profits less the five-hundred-thousand-dollar market value of
Aniston’s endorsement.
233. Quantum meruit here refers to the market value had Sally negotiated an endorsement deal with
Aniston.
234. This ignores harm to Aniston’s autonomy and dignity through controlling the use of her own
identity. This further ignores reputational or “brand” harm to Aniston if, for example, Sally’s shampoo
is faulty or of low quality. These are discussed in the final section.
235. See Madow, supra note 175, at 195–96.
236. In the introductory hypothetical, there are not enough facts given to determine whether Sally
would be liable for other privacy torts or whether Sally should be liable for exemplary damages.
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Overprotecting the Right to Exclusive Publicity Likely Aids
Advertisers Who Commodify Consumer Attention

Some courts and commentators have argued that treating intangible
rights (e.g., the right to publicity, patents, copyrights) like a property right
most effectively incentivizes desirable behavior, including incentivizing
producing new material.237 The right of publicity should—according to
this argument—incentivize enterprise, creativity, and achievement.
Indeed, this view has received considerable support from both courts238
and commentators.239 However, this assumes that such enterprise,
creativity, and achievement will not materialize without the opportunity
to market one’s publicity. This assumption is flawed.
237. See, e.g., Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is
There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 Yale L.J. 1125, 1129 (1980) (observing that the right of
publicity provides an incentive for enterprise and creativity by allowing individuals to benefit from
their personal efforts); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 282–85 (1970) (“Without
copyright protection a copying publisher could avoid many of the costs of the original
publisher . . . by photographing the printed pages of a published book. If competition then forced book
prices down to the copier’s cost, the first publisher and the author could not obtain adequate
compensation.”).
238. See, e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Cornelia, J. dissenting) (“[T]he right of publicity fosters the production of intellectual and creative
works by providing the financial incentive for individuals to expend the time and resources necessary
to produce them.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 287 (2d. Cir. 1981)
(Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“[T]he public policy of providing incentives for individual enterprise and
investment of capital and energy argues for allowing an individual to pass the fruits of his labors along
to others after his death.”); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 1982) (“Recognition of the right of publicity rewards and thereby
encourages effort and creativity. If the right of publicity dies with the celebrity, the economic value
of the right of publicity during life would be diminished . . . .”); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603
P.2d 425, 441 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (“Similarly, providing legal protection for the
economic value in one’s identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation creates a powerful
incentive for expending time and resources to develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public
recognition and assures that the individual will be able to reap the reward of his endeavors . . . .”
(citations and quotation marks omitted)).
239. See, e.g., Felcher & Rubin, supra note 237, at 1128 (“The social policy underlying the right
of publicity is encouragement of individual enterprise and creativity by allowing people to profit from
their own efforts.”); Steven J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 111, 118 (1980) (“Like the copyright and patent regimes, the right of publicity may
foster the production of intellectual and creative works by providing the financial incentive for
individuals to expend the time and resources necessary to produce them.”); David E. Shipley,
Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 673, 681 (1981) (“Protecting the right of publicity provides incentive for
performers to make the economic investments required to produce performances appealing to the
public.”); D. Scott Gurney, Note, Celebrities and the First Amendment: Broader Protection Against
the Unauthorized Publication of Photographs, 61 IND. L.J. 697, 707 (1986) (stating that the right of
publicity serves to “maximize incentive to develop and maintain skills and talents that society finds
appealing”).
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Despite arguments to the contrary, mitigating public figures’ exclusive
right of publicity is unlikely to negatively impact the entertainment
industry. “Actors and musicians . . . will certainly not cease making
movies or record albums if their images are freely available for use on Tshirts and the like.”240 Take the example of Jennifer Aniston, whose wild
success in the ‘90s sitcom, Friends, generated much renown. Would
Friends have never been created but for the opportunity for Aniston to
make vast monetary gains endorsing cosmetics? Neither Lisa Kudrow,
Courtney Cox, nor Matt LeBlanc command anywhere near Aniston’s
endorsement income, so what incentivized them to bring their enterprise,
creativity, and achievement to the show? Indeed, very few actors from
similarly situated shows could have reasonably expected to demand any
endorsement value well after the shows’ conclusions. And what of the
writers and directors,241 costume designers,242 composers,243 and
producers244 who made the show a success? These contributors would be
intrinsically incentivized by their own paychecks or financial stakes in the
show’s success, but these contributors had little opportunity to develop
the recognizability protected by misappropriation claims. If the driving
policy argument behind the right of publicity is the incentive to provide
quality entertainment, then perhaps Friends costume designer Debra
McGuire should be entitled to some percentage of Aniston’s income from
her Aveeno endorsements. 245
As discussed above, recognizability grows with attention, which grows
with recognizability.246 A business that produces widgets exploits land
and labor to grow as a business; a celebrity or influencer exploits
consumers’ time and attention to increase recognizability and commercial
value. Thus, if protecting publicity as a property right incentivizes
anything, then it incentivizes exploiting time and attention. As Richard
Posner famously explained, overprotecting a property right incentivizes
less-than-ideal outcomes.247 Accordingly, when a plaintiff enjoys the
opportunity for substantial windfalls in a misappropriation action, and the

240. Madow, supra note 175, at 204.
241. For example, David Crane and Marta Kauffman.
242. Costume designer Debra McGuire was instrumental in creating each character’s style and
persona.
243. Michael Skoff and Allee Willis.
244. For example, Kevin Bright, Michael Borkow, and Shana Goldberg-Meehan.
245. For more details on Aniston’s 2012 deal with Aveeno, see Tschinkel, supra note 227.
246. See supra section II.D.
247. See generally Richard A. Posner, Do We Have Too Many Intellectual Property Rights?, 9
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 173 (2006). Richard Posner is an American judge and law and
economics scholar.
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“right of publicity” is strongly protected, incentives to build a personal
brand will rise.
Even if one takes the moral stance that people should be rewarded for
their efforts, then celebrities and influencers are not the right people to
reward: consumers are. Returning to the R-A-R′ fame model, the
recognizability increase derives from the attention exploitation. And as
attention economics teaches us, attention is finite. Cognitive resources are
scarce; thus, consuming one unit of media necessarily means a dearth of
something else.248 Consumers who spent their six o’clock hour watching
Friends on a Thursday in 1999 did so at the expense of watching The
Sopranos, reading a book, calling their grandmother, or going for a walk.
If, morally, someone ought to be compensated when a person’s likeness
is misappropriated, then perhaps it should be the consumer. For example,
a consumer may purchase Sally’s shampoo with the belief that it is
endorsed by Aniston. If anyone is to receive Sally’s excess profits (other
than Sally), perhaps it should be returned to the duped consumer. In short,
courts and commentators alike argue that strong protections for the
exclusive right to publicity encourage creative and productive capacity,
but this argument is flawed and directly counter to real-world experience.
C.

Claims in Which Awarding Defendant Profits Would be Equitable
or Efficient Should Be Brought Under Different Privacy Actions

There may be instances in which awarding more generous damages in
a misappropriation claim might be efficient or equitable; however, such
damages are more appropriate for another privacy tort, either in lieu of or
in addition to the underlying appropriation claim. Indeed, plaintiffs who
sue for privacy invasion commonly do so under multiple claims.249 Courts
are then tasked with parsing out damages between various violated
interests and verifying that a plaintiff is not doubly compensated for the
same interest. If the instances in which awarding defendant profits or
reputational harm were brought squarely under a different privacy action,
courts may have an easier time ensuring that plaintiffs are not doubly
indemnified for the same interest and preventing inequitable windfalls.
For example, when misappropriation of a person’s likeness
embarrasses that person or harms that person’s reputation by disclosing
private facts, additional damages are more appropriately sought under a
disclosure of private facts suit. When misappropriation harms a person’s
reputation or embarrasses them by mischaracterizing facts, additional
damages are more appropriately sought under a false light suit. When
248. DAVENPORT & BECK, supra note 176.
249. See MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at 11-78 to -79.
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publicizing facts about a person’s life are harmful by virtue of the
intrusion, then additional damages are more appropriately sought under a
suit for intrusion upon seclusion. Finally, when consumers are harmed by
the misappropriation, many other non-privacy-related actions could be
taken to compensate them (including consumer protection claims, which
are not addressed in this Comment).
1.

When the Appropriation Is Embarrassing

A plaintiff harmed when the misappropriation reveals the person’s
private affairs is more appropriately compensated under a Disclosure of
Private Facts action, as is exemplified in Chryssikos v. MCC Radio,
LLC.250 Peter Chryssikos owned an alarm-monitoring company and
enjoyed a contract with the city of Desert Hot Springs, California.251 Lee
Rayburn, a local radio talk show host, began a smear campaign in which
he falsely accused Chryssikos of, among other things, being investigated
by the FBI for child pornography, committing credit card fraud and
identity theft, making death threats, defrauding the city, and physically
abusing his former partner.252 Chryssikos, who was not previously wellknown in his community, lost 90% of his business, his children were
bullied at school, and he received death threats.253 Chryssikos sued
Rayburn and Rayburn’s employer, MCC Radio, for defamation,
disclosure of private facts, appropriation of name for a commercial
purpose, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.254
The California Court of Appeals held that Chryssikos presented a
viable case of misappropriation because the defendants ran “a
promotional campaign for their radio station in which Rayburn stated ‘all
you have to do is stop by and ask, “[w]ho is Pete Chryss?” . . . [W]e’ve
got a complimentary buffet for two for . . . anybody who stops by and
asks, “[w]ho is Pete Chryss?”’”255 The court further held that Chryssikos
made a prima facie case for disclosure of private facts because the
defendants publicly disclosed details about Chryssikos’s relationship
twenty years earlier, including details about a child out of wedlock.256
And, unsurprisingly, the court finally held that Chryssikos’s defamation
250. No. G049831, 2014 WL 6992909 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2014).
251. Id. at *1.
252. Id.
253. Joe Harris, Character Assassination for Sport, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Dec. 9, 2011),
https://www.courthousenews.com/character-assassination-for-sport/ [https://perma.cc/83GDXB4W] (describing the context of the suit).
254. Id.
255. Chryssikos, 2014 WL 6992909, at *4.
256. Id.
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claim was merited. 257
If Chryssikos won all his claims in the subsequent trial, how should a
court have calculated damages? Should Chryssikos be entitled to the radio
station’s increased profits from Rayburn’s smear campaign? One’s first
moral intuition may be a resounding yes. Why should Rayburn be able to
keep any increased profits from using his business to bully private
citizens? But one’s moral intuition about equity in this case strongly
conflate Rayburn’s acts of misappropriation with his acts of defamation
and disclosure of private facts. For a defamation claim in California,
Chryssikos can recover for harm to his reputation and harm to his
business.258 He can also recover “exemplary” damages if he can prove that
Rayburn harbored ill will toward Chryssikos.259 While this Comment
leaves out much of the case’s history, such a finding is likely. 260 For
Chryssikos’s intrusion upon seclusion claim, he can recover for
reputational or business harm, specifically for disclosing details about his
relationship twenty years prior.261
It seems unlikely that, before the smear campaign, Chryssikos intended
to commercialize his own likeness. Indeed, during the smear campaign,
Chryssikos lived with city councilman Karl Baker, and the case facts
suggest that Chryssikos and Baker just wanted to be left alone.262
Accordingly, the rationale of protecting against unjust enrichment may
not be appropriate for this case. Chryssikos should be compensated for the
irreparable reputational harm, the shame, and the humiliation that
Rayburn caused. And because Rayburn used Chryssikos’s name to
promote his show, Rayburn should be forced to compensate Chryssikos
for the advertisement value. But Chryssikos did not have a prior interest
in MCC Radio’s revenue; he just wanted to be left alone.263
As exemplified here, where publicity harms a plaintiff through
broadcasting private affairs, the plaintiff should be able to seek
compensation for misappropriation of likeness. However, additional
damages for embarrassment or harm to reputation are probably more
appropriately brought through a suit for disclosure of private facts. This

257. Id.
258. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(a)–(b), (d) (West 2021).
259. Id. § 48a(b).
260. See Harris, supra note 253.
261. See generally Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971), rev’d on other
grounds by Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
262. Chryssikos, 2014 WL 6992909, at *1.
263. For a similar case involving details disclosed about a former gang member, see Doe v.
Gangland Prods., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded, 730 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2013).
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is particularly true where, as is often the case, the plaintiff had no desire
to monetize their identity anyway.
2.

When the Misappropriation Makes the Victim Look Bad

A plaintiff whose reputation is harmed through publicity
misappropriation is more appropriately compensated under a false light
action. This is particularly exemplified by Dice v. X17, Inc.264 One sunny
afternoon, Peter Dice, a “sobriety coach” who helps others get sober and
instructs on sober living, went to a Venice Beach restaurant with Lindsay
Lohan and an unidentified man.265 Photographers from X17, a celebrity
news agency, filmed the exchange from nearby.266 The video showed
Lohan and the unidentified man inspecting a plastic bag, as the
photographers whispered “cocaina” and “droga” into the camera.267 In
reality, the bag contained “healing crystals” used in alternative medicine,
not illegal drugs.268 X17 published the video on its website with the text
“Lindsay Lohan Makes Purchase in Venice” in bold above a smaller
caption that said “Lindsay makes purchase on the street in Venice.”269 An
accompanying article, titled “EXCLUSIVE VIDEO—LINDSAY
LOHAN MAKES A PURCHASE ON VENICE STREET,” strongly
implied that Lohan purchased illicit drugs. 270
Dice sued X17 for defamation, misappropriation, false light, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.271 Further, Dice presented
evidence that X17 published the video and article either knowing that it
falsely implied a drug transaction, or recklessly disregarding whether the
implication was true.272 Accordingly, Dice established a prima facie case
for defamation and false light.273 Dice further established a prima facie
case of commercial misappropriation because X17 used his identity for a
commercial benefit.274
Although the settlement was not disclosed, this Comment argues that
264. No. B243910, 2014 WL 99074 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2014).
265. Id. at *1.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at *2.
270. Id.
271. Id. The opinion describes the “false light” claim generically as “invasion of privacy,” but the
parties’ briefs specify that this claim was for “invasion of privacy–false light.” Brief for DefendantAppellant at 4, Dice v. X17, Inc., No. B243910, 2014 WL 99074 (Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2013).
272. Dice, 2014 WL 99074, at *8.
273. Id.
274. Id. at *8–9.
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Dice should not be entitled to X17’s profits from the offending video and
article. Even without explicitly saying so, X17 strongly implied that Dice
was a party to a drug transaction. Accordingly, the court correctly allowed
Dice’s defamation and false light claim. And X17 indeed profited by using
Dice’s identity, for which he should be compensated.275 But Dice did not
create the website, create the video hosting platform, or directly contribute
to X17’s readership. Awarding Dice X17’s profits would therefore
constitute a clear windfall, and such a windfall would lead to suboptimal
outcomes.
At the time of the recording, X17 boasted two-hundred thousand users
per day, and over one million weekly visitors to its website.276 When the
suit was filed, the record suggested that X17’s coverage of Lohan
“generates tremendous public interest and brings millions of users and
drives licensing of photos to other organizations.”277 The record does not
indicate the utility to readers for reading about Lohan, or how much the
settlement ended up being in Dice v. X17. But suppose that each of X17’s
weekly users gained five dollars worth of utility from watching a
scandalous video about Lohan. Further suppose that X17 earns two dollars
for every user who viewed the video, either through ad revenue or
aggregated subscription revenue. Under this model, X17’s consumers
gained an aggregate five-million-dollar benefit (five dollars multiplied by
one million weekly users), and X17 gained an aggregate two-milliondollar benefit (two dollars multiplied by one million users). To measure
social utility, we do not add these numbers because users pay for the video
either through subscription or by watching ads. Further suppose that,
between reputational, emotional, and business harm, Dice suffered two
million dollars in losses. These numbers were selected arbitrarily, but the
logic still applies if one dramatically dials the variables up or down.
In this model, X17 created a three-million-dollar social benefit by
posting the video; a five-million-dollar benefit to its consumers less the
two million dollars in harm to Dice. As described above, Dice can recover
for his pecuniary losses under either the defamation, false light, or
misappropriation claims. However, in California, Dice can also recover
X17’s increased profits under his misappropriation claims. But because
Dice congruently brought multiple claims, should he be able to recover
two million dollars in harm for his defamation claim, and then five million
dollars in unjust enrichment? If a court allows this, then Dice would enjoy
275. Although in this case, the story would not likely have been published if not for Lohan’s
presence. It seems unlikely that a celebrity tabloid or its readership would care much about a random
life coach from Los Angeles purchasing drugs on a beach.
276. Transcript of Oral Argument, Dice, 2014 WL 99074, at 7.
277. Id.
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a five-million-dollar windfall gain (a seven-million-dollar award less two
million dollars in actual harm). Even if his defamation and false light
claims were somehow unavailable to him (e.g., if Dice were a public
figure who failed to prove actual malice), Dice will enjoy a three-milliondollar windfall gain if the court merely grants him X17’s increased profits,
as allowed under California statute. Even if a windfall is not intrinsically
undesirable, the tort system should, whenever possible, encourage
efficient outcomes. A three-million-dollar social benefit is an efficient
outcome, but X17 would not have published the video under this regime
despite a socially optimal outcome because it would either reap zero
dollars in profits or lose two million dollars, depending on how the court
awarded damages.
Would limiting damages to quantum meruit lead to an efficient
outcome? Measuring quantum meruit in a case like this sounds strange
because a “sobriety coach” would probably not consent to star in a video
in which he is ostensibly a party to a drug transaction. However, if Dice’s
total harm from the publication is two million dollars, then an
economically rational Dice would willingly allow the video to be
published if paid any amount higher than two million dollars. If the social
benefit here is higher than the harm to Dice, then X17 could theoretically
raise prices enough to compensate Dice while keeping a marginal profit.
Accordingly, X17 would still publish the video, and society at large would
enjoy the three-million-dollar benefit.
Suppose that the hypothetical above grossly overestimated scandalous
celebrity videos’ social benefits, and grossly underestimated Dice’s
reputational harm. Specifically, suppose that X17’s users each derive only
one penny’s worth of utility from watching a scandalous celebrity video,
X17 earns only one penny’s worth for each user, and Dice suffered ten
million dollars in harm from the misappropriation. Here, the social benefit
would be merely ten thousand dollars, whereas the social cost would be
ten million dollars. Posting a video in this scenario would not be socially
optimal. Additionally, even under California’s current misappropriation
regime, Dice would rationally choose to recover only for his own
damages, not the mere ten thousand dollars in unjust enrichment. If X17
is rational, then it would not have published the video in this scenario, and
not publishing the video would be the socially optimal outcome. If X17 is
not rational, then courts can at least compensate its victims for the harm it
causes, albeit under a different privacy tort.
Note, however, that in this case, Lohan’s reputation was also harmed,
and she presumably had similar claims against X17. While the model
complicates as more entities and variables are added, the socially optimal
outcome is still reached only through quantum meruit. Further,
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hypothetical economic models often assume that agents are rational—that
is, they act in ways that maximize their own well-being. This assumption
may not be true for all defendants. Further, defendants and plaintiffs may
measure harm differently; courts may be commonly put in a position of
measuring “objective” dollar amounts between parties with competing
interests. And tort law’s deterrence effect may not apply to irrational
defendants, compensation regime notwithstanding.
As exemplified here, where publicity harms a plaintiff through
broadcasting mischaracterizing facts, the plaintiff should be able to seek
compensation for misappropriation of likeness. However, additional
damages for embarrassment or harm to reputation from the
mischaracterization are more appropriately brought through a suit for
false light. This is commonly the case where the plaintiff is a celebrity and
the defendant is a tabloid or celebrity news outlet, and the defendant
mischaracterizes facts about the celebrity’s life in order to maximize
audience engagement. Where social welfare is increased by
misappropriation, then it would be tautologically a suboptimal outcome
to discourage such misappropriation.
3.

When the Victim Just Wants to Be Left Alone

A plaintiff who simply wanted to be left alone or avoid unwanted
publicity when a defendant misappropriated the plaintiff’s likeness is
more appropriately compensated under an intrusion upon seclusion claim.
Suppose that in Dice, X17’s photographers had instead climbed a fence to
film Dice while he was sunbathing in his backyard. If X17 posted the
video on its website, Dice would have a claim for misappropriation for
the same reason he did in the actual case: X17 used Dice’s recognizable
identity without his permission to derive commercial benefit.278 But
would appropriating a commercial interest be the real harm to Dice? Does
the economic opportunity cost cause a reader to recoil when reading about
such “peeping Tom” cases? No. Such cases are repulsive because the
defendant intruded, offensively, into the plaintiff’s seclusion.
Accordingly, plaintiffs should be compensated (as they are in intrusion
upon seclusion cases) for emotional harm. If the plaintiff acted
intentionally, courts duly award punitive damages to deter this behavior.
And even when a plaintiff cannot prove actual damages, courts
appropriately award nominal damages to recognize that the defendant
violated the plaintiff’s right. Considering such cases as an economic
278. An important issue in Dice was whether the video was a legitimate matter of public interest,
and therefore protected by the First Amendment. It was not, and privacy law cases have repeatedly
held that “peeping Tom” defendants are not entitled to First Amendment protection.
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opportunity tort under misappropriation misses the forest for the sterile,
commercial trees.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND POTENTIAL COSTS TO
LIMITING MISAPPROPRIATION DAMAGES TO QUANTUM
MERUIT
Limiting damages in a misappropriation claim to quantum meruit may
mitigate windfall gains to plaintiffs, mitigate extreme commodification of
consumer attention, and contribute to more efficient outcomes. However,
adopting such a damage calculation regime may come with some risks.
For example, marketers may be incentivized to use public personas
without permission, and then negotiate a settlement after the fact. If
damages are limited to the market value of using an identity, why would
a malevolent marketer bother seeking consent when there is a chance that
the would-be plaintiff would not file suit? Relatedly, there may be
instances in which people do not consent to use their identity because such
use would offend or harm their image. Would such a regime disempower
people from choosing when, where, and how their identity is used? The
following sections address those risks.
A.

Limiting Damages to Quantum Meruit May Incentivize Malevolent
Marketers to Beg Forgiveness Rather than Ask Permission

Suppose that Sally, rather than selling shampoo, sells hair growth
supplements. Suppose further that Sally reaches out to Aniston to seek an
endorsement for Sally’s product. Fearing reputational harm from
associating with a hair loss product, Aniston promptly refuses. If the
applicable jurisdiction limits misappropriation damages to quantum
meruit, and if Sally is not bound by ethical considerations, then why
should Aniston’s objection stop Sally?
Such an argument ignores exorbitant litigation costs and other damages
awarded. For example, when one model sued a nutritional supplements
retailer for misappropriation of likeness, the court reduced the model’s
claim for actual damages to a fraction of what he sought because the
retailer defeated his demand for unauthorized profits.279 However,
because the model was the “prevailing party” in that claim, California
statute awarded him attorney’s fees, for which he asked for

279. Olive v. Gen. Nutrition Ctrs., Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 631–32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018),
vacated, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
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$7.3 million.280 If the retailer could efficiently use the model’s image,281 a
rational retailer would have negotiated a contract with the model before
using his image.
Further, when the defendant’s misappropriation is intentional, courts
will award punitive damages to deter future wrongdoing.282 As economist
Steven Shavell notes, excessive punitive damages can create excessive
incentives to avoid liability risk, and generally inefficient outcomes.283 To
achieve the most efficient outcome, punitive damages should be set as a
multiplier that represents the probability that a plaintiff will fail to sue the
wrongdoer.284 For example, in the analogy above, if Aniston fails to sue
Sally for her misappropriation, Sally would reap an additional fivehundred thousand dollar windfall. If policymakers estimate that 20% of
would-be misappropriation plaintiffs fail to sue, then an efficient level of
punitive damages would represent an additional 20% of damages
awarded.285
An accurate measure of quantum meruit would usually encapsulate
harm to the plaintiff’s persona value. For example, models and celebrities
consider “dilution” as they make additional deals for using their image.286
Accordingly, they consider brand value deterioration in valuing their
contracts.287 Thus, the fair market value of the contract that should have
been negotiated will fairly compensate a plaintiff for reputational harm.
In short, if discouraging misappropriation would decrease overall social
welfare, then discouraging misappropriation tautologically leads to
suboptimal outcomes.
B.

Limiting Damage Awards to that Which Defendants Would Have
Paid Anyway Had They Contracted for the Plaintiffs’ Image
Disempowers Would-be Plaintiffs

Limiting damages in a misappropriation claim to quantum meruit or
actual reputational harm may lead to more efficient outcomes when
“efficient” merely refers to maximizing total social commercial value.
280. See id.; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 67, Olive v. Gen. Nutrition Ctrs., Inc., No. B279490,
2017 WL 6496550 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2017).
281. I.e., if the retailer could benefit from using the image more than model was harmed.
282. See supra section I.D.
283. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 272–73 (2004).
284. Id.
285. See generally id. at 272.
286. Paula B. Mays, Protection of a Persona, Image, and Likeness: The Emergence of the Right of
Publicity, 89 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 819, 821–22 (2007).
287. Id.; see also Puja Khatri, Celebrity Endorsement: A Strategic Promotion Perspective, 1
INDIAN MEDIA STUD. J. 25, 29–32 (2006).
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However, this view may overlook any intrinsic value to a would-be
plaintiff in controlling how her image is used. For example, in the
hypothetical above, if Sally estimates that her increased revenue in hair
growth products will be greater than the reputational harm to Aniston for
the ostensible endorsement, then it may be economically “efficient” for
Sally to use Aniston’s identity without her consent. However, this
disregards non-economic costs, including harm to Aniston’s dignity and
autonomy in controlling how and when her image is used.
As described above, limiting compensatory damages to quantum
meruit would not likely incentivize additional misappropriation because
courts often award punitive damages and attorney’s fees. Even without
such an award, litigation is prohibitively expensive. Further, if a plaintiff
suffers actual harm through association with a certain product, they should
be able to bring an action under a different cause of action. In the
hypothetical above, if Sally places Aniston before the public in a false
light—through the implication that Aniston is losing her hair—Sally
would be liable to Aniston for false light. Specifically, implying that
Aniston is losing her hair would be offensive to the reasonable person.288
C.

Awarding Damages Based on Defendant Profits More Generously
Compensates Plaintiffs for Potential Reputational Harm

If a defendant’s profits from misappropriation are greater than the
market value of the plaintiff’s likeness, then limiting damages to quantum
meruit would less generously compensate plaintiffs. But in either case,
awarding damages based on provable harm to a plaintiff’s reputation is
still available. Because reputational damage might be difficult to prove,
one might argue that courts should err toward a more generous
compensation regime.
Oftentimes, that a plaintiff’s commercial value was harmed is
intuitively obvious.289 But sometimes, the damage amount might be hard
to calculate. Plaintiffs have tools to demonstrate the value of reputational
harm; these include expert testimony from industry insiders and forensic
economists.290 Further, if a plaintiff claims damages based on quantum
288. See supra section I.C; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. L. INST. 1977).
289. See, e.g., Clark v. Celeb Pub., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (awarding damages for
the diminished value of plaintiff’s services as a model resulting from defendant’s use of plaintiff’s
photograph in a pornographic magazine).
290. See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of Com. v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp 533, 546–47 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
(both the plaintiff and defendant used expert testimony to show commercial licensing value of the
plaintiff’s persona); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“[T]he Court can
take judicial notice that there is a fairly active market for exploitation of the faces, names and
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meruit or increased profits, they would still need to provide expert
testimony to demonstrate either the fair market value of an endorsement
or the portion of the defendant’s increased profits attributable to the
misappropriation. Thus, an argument in favor of more generous damages
based on a lack of information or provability is flawed.
CONCLUSION
Considering attention economics and commodity theory, the current
regime of awarding misappropriation damages based on increased profits
for the defendant leads to suboptimal inefficient outcomes. Further,
overprotecting the right of publicity likely contributes to the extreme
commodification of consumer attention. Advertisers have an infinite
appetite for consumer attention, and public figures market and sell this
attention. By overprotecting the vehicle by which public figures can do
this—their recognizability and brand value—overprotection of
recognizability facilitates such commodification. This Comment has
argued that, under an attention commodification model, limiting damages
to quantum meruit would lead to more efficient outcomes. Additionally,
specific appropriation of likeness claims which might lead to inefficient
outcomes under quantum meruit would better fit under the elements and
justification of other privacy rights.
If Sally’s misappropriation of Aniston’s likeness yields desirable social
outcomes, then tort law should not discourage Sally’s misappropriation.
In her appropriation of likeness claim, Aniston should be compensated for
the fair market value of the use of her image; not one dollar more or one
dollar less. If Aniston’s brand value is harmed by Sally’s use,291 she
should seek compensation under a different privacy tort. Further, public
figures generally benefit from an attention-recognizability feedback loop,
whereby consumer attention is increasingly devoted to a shrinking
number of individuals. For example, is Mark Wahlberg so highly sought
after in movie roles because of some combination of a striking appearance
and abundant talent? Or is Wahlberg so sought after because he skillfully
markets his brand? Indeed, because public figures like Aniston use their
recognizability to sell consumer attention to advertisers, overprotecting
such recognizability contributes to attention commodification. In short,
limiting damages in an appropriation of likeness claim will lead to more
socially beneficial outcomes, and mitigate attention commodification.
reputations of celebrities, and such market—like any other—must have its recognized rules and
experts.”); Treece, supra note 133, at 651 (describing how plaintiff can prove the value of their
identity by reference to the current market rate for endorsements of celebrities of similar stature).
291. However, the brand value would probably not be harmed. See supra section IV.C.2.

